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1. INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture Canada is concerned about the funding of agricultural programs as 
the number of shared-cost federal-provincial programs increase and requests from 
provinces for special assistance proliferate. Many of these requests are justified on the 
basis that the provinces do not have the ability to pay or the widespread extent of the 
problem. This raises questions of the appropriate interrelationships between agricultural 
programs and the federal-provincial fiscal arrangements. This study is designed to gain 
a better understanding of the principles involved in the federal-provincial fiscal 
arrangements and their relevance for agriculture and to establish clearer guidelines in 
responding to provincial requests. 
This study examines the basis for federal-provincial fiscal programs and federal 
transfer programs from a theoretical, legal and historical point of view. It also 
examines the special case of agriculture and the shared federal-provincial responsibility 
for agriculture under the constitution. A primary focus is to assess the rationale for 
special assistance programs for provinces or commodity groups such as those for grain 
farmers within the context of the overall framework of federal-provincial fiscal 
relations. The study also examines the fiscal consequences of increasing shared-cost 
programs in agriculture. 
Section 2, which covers Phase I of this study, assembles the background 
information on the federal-provincial fiscal arrangements. It includes a review of the 
evolution of the federal-provincial arrangements from a historical and legal point of 
view, tracing developments from the Rowell-Sirois Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations, the National Adjustments Grants and tax sharing, to the Fiscal Arrangements 
Act (1987). The Canadian experience with shared-cost programs is summarised. The 
Disaster Financial Assistance arrangements are examined. The fiscal implications of the 
constitutional division of responsibilities between federal and provincial governments 
are also reviewed and analyzed. Section 2 of the study also contains a review and 
analysis of the available data on federal-provincial fiscal arrangements including trends 
and provincial distribution and provincial fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. 
Section 3, which covers Phase II of this study, focuses on the implications of the 
federal-provincial fiscal arrangements for agriculture. The relevance for agriculture of 
other sector transfer programs in such areas as health and education as well as general 
transfer programs such as equalization is considered. Section 3 also examines the 
constitutional basis for federal shared-cost programs in agriculture, the rationale for 
federal shared-cost programs in agriculture, the evolution of shared-cost programs in 
agriculture, the fiscal consequences of increasing shared-cost programs in agriculture, 
and the implications for cost sharing of programs in agriculture. Section 3 also presents: 
conclusions on the implications of the fiscal arrangements and agricultural programs for 
future cost sharing relationships with the provinces. Issues critical for the development 
of principles for cost sharing with the provinces are underlined; some guidelines to 
assist in the development of future shared-cost programs in agriculture are offered; and 
some suggestions for further work. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Fiscal cash transfers from the federal government to provincial governments 
under the provisions of various programs are budgeted at $24.2 billion in 1990-91, or 
about 16.4 per cent of federal budgetary expenditures. These transfers account for more 
than 40 per cent of total revenues in the Atlantic provinces and just over 20 per cent in 
the high income provinces of Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia. The Fiscal 
Arrangements Act alone accounts for three quarters of federal cash transfers. In 
addition to cash transfers, there are also tax transfers amounting to $11.3 billion in 
1990-91. The percentage distribution of cash and tax transfers among the three major 
programs of Established Programs Financing (EPF), Equalization, and the Canada 
Assistance Plan (CAP) is given in Chart 1. 
CHART 1 
FEDERAL TRANSFERS BY PROGRAM, 1990-9: 
EPF (520%) 
2 
Projected per capita transfers in 1990-91 under the three largest programs are 
shown in Chart 2. The per capita EPF transfers are equal for all the provinces. 
Transfers under the Canada Assistance Plan are more variable as they depend on 
provincial spending on income maintenance and social services. Equalization payments 
are the most variable going to the provinces with a lower capacity to raise revenues 
than the average of the five standard provinces. 
CHART 2 
MAJOR FEDERAL TRANSFERS, 1990-91 
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Other programs counted as general purpose fiscal transfer payments include 
subsidies under the Constitution Acts, Public Utilities Income Tax Transfers, Reciprocal 
Taxation Payments, grants to municipalities in lieu of property taxes, and transfers to 
the territorial governments. These programs are budgeted to cost $1.5 billion in 1990-91 
and account for 4 1/4 per cent of total transfer payments. 
Specific transfers come under such rubrics as Crop Insurance, official languages 
in education, legal aid and Young Offenders Act related payments, contributions for the 
vocational rehabilitation of disabled persons, payments for alcohol and drug treatment 
and rehabilitation. Specific transfers will cost around $1 billion in 1990-91 and comprise 
3 per cent of total spending on transfers. 
4 
2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The Federal government has paid statutory subsidies to the provinces since 
Confederation. This has stemmed from the greater access of the federal government to 
the main revenue sources. At the time of Confederation the Federal Government took 
over the most important revenue sources of the time, customs and excise taxes, and in 
return agreed to make annual payments to the provinces. 
Revenues from customs and excise taxes became less important after the 
introduction of the income tax, but the Federal Government still maintained a greater 
access to the main revenue sources. This was not so much as a result of the distribution 
of powers to tax under the Constitution as from the position of the federal government 
as Canada's senior government and its prior occupation of the tax room. Under the 
Constitution Act the federal and provincial government are both empowered to rely on 
direct taxation such as the personal and corporate tax to raise revenue. (Section 92(2) of 
the Constitution Act of 1867 confers upon provinces the power to raise revenues by 
"Direct Taxation Within the Province" and Section 91(3) gives the federal government 
power to raise revenues "by any Mode or System of Taxation.") 
By the 1930s the federal government and the provinces had in place personal and 
corporate income taxes. However, there was a lack of coordination that resulted in a 
"tax jungle." In addition, the provincial governments were in great financial difficulties. 
The Depression depressed their revenues and the heavy demands for spending on relief, 
highways and education kept their expenditures up. The federal government had been 
barred from direct spending in these areas by a restrictive interpretation of its 
constitutional responsibilities. Conditional and unconditional grants to the provinces 
were provided to meet pressing needs. There was a clear imbalance between spending 
responsibilities and abilities to raise revenues. 
One response to the financial crisis of the 1930s was the establishment of the 
Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations in 1937 to review 
federal-provincial fiscal relations. Two basic problems were examined: 1) the federal-
provincial distribution of spending responsibilities and revenues; and 2) regional 
disparities. 
The Rowell-Sirois Commission, which reported in 1940, recommended that the 
Federal Government take over the provincial debts, responsibility for unemployment 
relief, and pay a "National Adjustment Grant" to the poorer provinces. The provinces in 
return would turn over to the Federal Government the personal and corporate income 
tax and succession duties. The Commission was very critical of the lack of uniformity of 
Canadian tax policy from one province to another and of the plethora of discriminatory 
tax measures imposed by the provincial governments. It also criticized the duplication 
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in the administration of the tax system. 
National Adjustment Grants, which were the precursors of equalization "were 
designed to make it possible for every province to provide, for its people, services of 
average Canadian standards." 1 They would be paid "whenever a provincial government 
established that it could not supply Canadian average standards of service and balance 
its budget without taxation (provincial and municipal) appreciably exceeding the 
national average in relation to income." 2 
The war prevented the implementation of the recommendations of the Rowell-
Sirois report. A Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1941 failed to come to agreement 
on the division of taxing powers. But, given the obvious overriding wartime needs of 
the Federal Government, the provinces did accede to the Minister of Finance's request 
to refrain from imposing personal and corporate income tax in return for fixed annual 
rental payments until one year after the end of the war (1941-46). Thus started the Tax 
Rental Agreements that came to include all provinces but Quebec. 
After the war in 1945 another Dominion-Provincial Conference was held at which 
the Federal Government introduced the "Green Book" containing a new set of proposals 
for federal-provincial fiscal relations. The Federal Government sought exclusive access 
to personal and corporate income taxes and succession duties and was willing to 
subsidize the provinces through a number of shared-cost programs. This proposal was 
unacceptable to the provinces, but, except for Quebec, they continued to participate in 
the Tax Rental Agreements because it would have been costly to set up their own 
provincial income tax systems. From 1947 to 1952 the tax rental was based on either a 
per capita payment or the revenue yield of the taxes (except for those to Prince Edward 
Island which were a specific lump sum). From 1952 to 1957 the tax rental payments 
were guaranteed to be above a certain minimum, with the actual amount adjusted 
upwards based on per capita GNP and population. 
The principle of equalization as enunciated by the Rowell-Sirois Commission was 
eventually accepted in the final set of tax rental agreements covering the 1957 to 1962 
period. Under this new agreement the federal government agreed to provide 
equalization payments to the provincial governments to bring the level of per capita 
yield from personal and corporate income taxes and succession duties up to the average 
of the yield in the two richest provinces. Equalization was received by all of the 
provinces except for Ontario. Over the years more and more revenue sources were 
added to the equalization formula. In 1967 the formula was broadened to include sixteen 
revenue sources and was based on national average yields rather than those in the two 
1 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations 
 (Ottawa: the 
Queen's Printer, 1940, p. 125. 
2 Ibid, p.83. 
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highest income provinces. Following some experimentation with ad hoc overrides of 
resource revenues in the late 1970s and with the "Ontario rider" that excluded from 
receiving equalization any province with income above the national average for three 
years, the formula was modified again in 1982 to be based on a five province standard. 
Growth of equalization payments were also capped at the growth of GNP from a 1982 
base. 
In 1962 the Tax Rental Agreements were succeeded by the Tax Collection 
Agreements that allowed provinces to impose their own income tax. As long as the tax 
was imposed on the federal base, then the federal government would administer the 
provincial acts as agents for the provincial governments free of charge. Under the new 
plan, in order to free up tax room for the provinces, the Federal Government reduced 
its tax bite by 16 per cent of personal income tax (increasing to 24 per cent in 1966), 
and 9 per cent of corporate profits . The Federal Government also agreed either to give 
the provinces 50 per cent of the revenues from federal succession duties or to grant an 
abatement equal to 50 per cent of the federal tax in the provinces that chose to levy 
their own succession duties. Under the Tax Collection Agreements Quebec continued to 
collect its own personal and corporate income tax and Ontario its own corporate income 
tax. 
The principle of opting out has an important place in the evolution of Canada's 
system of federal-provincial transfers. It first occurred in 1960 when Quebec pulled out 
from the federal university grant program in return for a tax abatement of 3 points. 
The current opting out arrangements began with the Established Programs (Interim 
Arrangements) Act in 1965 and allowed provinces to opt out of particular shared-cost 
programs up to October 1965. Eligible for compensation in the form of tax points were 
hospital insurance (16 points), and special welfare programs (5 points). Qualifying for 
cash compensation were several smaller programs. Only Quebec exercised its right to 
opt out by the deadline. Quebec's total abatements of tax points were 24 points prior to 
the 1972 tax reform and 1977 EPF. After adjustment for the 9.143 equalized tax points 
transferred under EPF and conversion for the new lower federal tax base after tax 
reform, Quebec had 16.5 tax points as a result of opting out. 
The Canada Assistance Plan was introduced in 1966 to encourage "the further 
development and extension of assistance and welfare programs throughout Canada by 
sharing more fully with the provinces in the cost." 3 It replaced the four main specific 
federal-provincial shared-cost social welfare programs with a more general cost sharing 
of provincial welfare and assistance schemes. CAP requires participating provinces to 
provide assistance to any person in need, without imposing a residence requirement. In 
return the federal government pays 50 per cent of the cost of sharable assistance and 
welfare services. 
3 Canada Assistance Plan, 1966-67, c.45, s.1, p.711. 
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In 1972 the federal government agreed under the tax collection agreements to 
administer provincial tax credits for a nominal cost. According to a 1981 submission on 
the fiscal arrangements made to the Parliamentary Task Force on Fiscal Arrangements 
by the Minister of Finance, three general guidelines are followed to determine whether 
a measure will be administered under the Tax Collection Agreement. "First, the 
measure must be able to be administered reasonably effectively. Second, the measure 
must not significantly erode the essential harmony and uniformity of the federal and 
provincial income tax systems. Third, the measure must not jeopardize the efficient 
functioning of the Canadian economic union by the erection of income tax barriers to 
normal interprovincial investment flows." 
In the 1980s the Prairie provinces were allowed to impose flat taxes on net 
income or taxable income instead of basic federal tax. 
Alberta withdrew from the agreement for the corporate tax in 1981 to get more 
control over its corporate tax structure. Ontario and Quebec have never entered into 
the Tax Collection Agreement with respect to their corporate tax. 
The federal financing of hospital insurance, medicare, and post-secondary 
eduction, which was the Federal Government's most expensive shared-cost program, was 
put on a new footing under the 1977 Fiscal Arrangements Act, called Established 
Programs Financing. It replaced a system of cost sharing through conditional grants (and 
tax points for post-secondary education) with transfers based on 1975-76 expenditure on 
these programs escalated by population and a three-year moving average of GNP per 
capita. The transfers are made in the form of tax points and cash transfers. A 
consequence of the end of cost sharing was that the provinces spent less on health and 
education than otherwise. By 1982 the Federal Government was paying around 60 per 
cent of the cost compared to about 50 per cent under the old shared-cost arrangements. 
The Federal Government moved in 1984 to reassert more control over provincial 
spending with the passage of the Canada Health Act which declared that the health 
payments would be reduced dollar for dollar for any amounts collected through extra 
billing by doctors or user fees. To underline the connection between payments and 
provincial spending on health and post-secondary education, the act was renamed the 
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Post-Secondary Education and Health 
Contributions Act. Starting in 1986-87, the Federal Government also began to scale 
back on the escalation factor for payments, ultimately freezing it for two years starting 
in 1990-91, in order make a contribution to deficit reduction. 
4 Department of Finance, Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements in the Eighties,  A 
Submission to the Parliamentary Task Force on the Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements, April 23, 1981, p. 54. 
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2.2 THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS 
2.2.1 Fiscal Equalization 
The Fiscal Equalization Program makes unconditional transfers to provinces that 
have relatively low capacity to raise revenues to finance public services. Seven 
provinces currently receiving payments are the four Atlantic provinces, Manitoba, 
Quebec and Saskatchewan. The transfers are made under Part I of the Federal-
Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health 
Contributions Act. In 1990-91 Fiscal Equalization will transfer $8.2 billion to the 
qualifying provinces. 
The objective of the Program is enshrined in Part III Section 36 (2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 in the following terms: 
"(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the 
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial 
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation." 
Equalization is, thus, designed to redress the problem that "while all provinces 
have the same responsibilities under the Constitution, their capacity to finance these 
responsibilities through taxation varies significantly from one province to another." 5 
The present Fiscal Arrangements Act and accompanying regulations, which was 
authorized on April 1, 1987 for a period of five years, specifies a formula that provides 
a comprehensive measure of each province's capacity to raise revenue from taxation. 
Each province's per capita capacity is compared to a per capita standard based on the 
average per capita capacity in five representative provinces, hence called the five 
province standard. The five representative provinces are British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. Excluded is Alberta the province with 
the highest per capita revenue generating capacity and the Atlantic provinces with the 
lowest per capita revenue generating capacity. 
A provinces entitlement is equal to its population multiplied by the per capita 
revenue shortfall, if any, between its yield from the representative tax system and the 
average per capita yield of the system in the five standard provinces. 
5 Department of Finance, Federal-Provincial Relations Division, The Fiscal 
Equalization Program, 
 April 1990, p.l. 
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The five province standard was adopted in the 1982 revision to the Fiscal 
Arrangements to make the equalization formula less sensitive to resource revenues. The 
run-up in oil prices in the 1970s would have caused a ballooning of equalization 
payments and would have even qualified Ontario for equalization if the federal 
government had not introduced several ad hoc overrides that capped resource revenues 
and precluded any province with per capita income above the national average from 
receiving equalization. The five province standard accomplished the same objectives, 
but in a less arbitrary and ad hoc way. As Alberta is not one of the five provinces, the 
weight accorded resource revenue in the formula is not disproportionate. 
It is the federal government's position that natural resource can not be viewed as 
a normal means of financing a reasonable level of public services in most provinces 
because they constitute such a small proportion of revenue in most provinces. Also it is 
difficult for the federal government to pay equalization on resource revenues since it 
does not have access to the resource revenues to finance the payments. 
The present Fiscal Arrangements Act allowed certain supplementary payments 
made in the previous five years to lapse. Regulations were introduced to make minor 
adjustments in the definitions of certain equalization sources. As no provinces were 
using succession duties and gift taxes, they were removed from the formula. Currently 
there are 32 revenue sources specified in the formula covering virtually all provincial 
revenue sources, including personal income tax corporate income tax, sales tax, and 
property tax. There is also a miscellaneous residual category. 
It might be useful to present the calculation behind the equalization formula in 
more detail. For each of the 32 revenue sources and the residual, a base is chosen that 
is close to that actually used by the provinces. Then for each revenue source a national 
average tax rate is determined by dividing total revenues in all provinces by the all 
province base for the particular revenue source. The national average rate is then 
applied to the tax base for each revenue source in each province and in the five 
standard provinces taken as a group. Equalization payments associated with each 
revenue source are calculated by taking the difference between the per capita yield of 
the revenue source in the province estimated at the national average tax rate and the 
per capita yield in the five standard provinces also estimated at the national average 
tax rate and multiplying the result by the provinces population. Equalization associated 
with a revenue source may be positive (a deficiency) or negative (an excess). Total 
equalization owing a province is calculated by summing up the deficiencies and 
excesses. If the balance is positive, the amount is paid to the province as equalization. 
If it is negative, no equalization is paid. 
In the 1982 revision to the Fiscal Arrangements Act, the growth of equalization 
payments from 1983-84 was constrained to not exceed the growth of GNP from a 1982 
base. This ceiling, which was reached in 1987, is binding in 1990-91 and will limit 
program spending to a level 23.7 per cent above the 1987-88 base. 
1 0 
There are also floor provisions that guarantee each individual provinces against a 
year-over-year reduction in its equalization entitlement of more than 5, 10 or 15 per 
cent depending on the revenue raising capacity of the province. According to the 
Federal-Provincial Relations Division's paper on equalization, 
"At the present time, Newfoundland and Prince Edward 
Island are protected against more than a 5 per cent decline 
(because their fiscal capacity is below 70 per cent of the 
national average); New Brunswick against more than a 10 per 
cent decline (because its per capita fiscal capacity is 
between 70 and 75 per cent of the national average); 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec and Nova Scotia against 
more than a 15 per cent decline (because their per capita 
fiscal capacities are above 75 per cent of the national 
average ) . /t6 
The Federal-Provincial Relations Division captures the essence of the program in 
noting 
"since the equalization standard is the same for all 
provinces, the provinces that qualify for equalization in a 
fiscal year are all raised, through the program, to an exactly 
equal level of revenue raising capacity. Hence, they are said 
to be "equalized: 17 
2.2.2 Established Programs Financing 
Total Established Programs Financing (EPF) payments are budgeted at $19.5 
billion in 1990-91. Of this, $8.2 billion are cash, $10.3 billion tax transfers, and $1 
billion associated equalization. Viewed another way, $13.9 billion are for health and $5.6 
billion for post-secondary education. 
The EPF grew out of earlier shared-cost programs in health and education. The 
Federal Government began joint programs with the provinces in health with the 
National Health Grants which were part of the postwar reconstruction program. In the 
1950s and 1960s the Federal Government encouraged the development of a nation-wide 
6 Federal-Provincial Relations Division, The Fiscal Equalization Program, p.8. 
7 Federal-Provincial Relations Division, The Fiscal Equalization Program, p.4. 
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health insurance system and the expansion of post-secondary education though cost 
sharing. The enabling legislation for health insurance was the Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act of 1957, and the Medical Care Act of 1966. Under cost sharing 
the Federal Government paid roughly 50 per cent of the eligible costs of hospital 
insurance, medical care, and post-secondary education. 
In the mid-1970s there was growing dissatisfaction with cost sharing from both 
the federal and provincial government. The Federal Government was unhappy with rapid 
growth of shared-cost payments and believed that the availability of 50 cent dollars was 
interfering with the provinces' incentive to control costs. The extent of this latter 
problem may have been somewhat overstated. Since under the cost-sharing formula the 
provinces only received 25 per cent of actual costs and 25 per cent of national average 
costs for hospital insurance and 50 per cent of national costs for medicare, cost sharing 
payments for an individual province were not tied that closely to that province's actual 
costs. Nevertheless, it was clear that the open-ended nature of the cost sharing 
arrangements limited the ability of the Federal Government to control and predict its 
own spending. The provincial governments were dissatisfied with the extent to which 
the cost sharing arrangements limited their flexibility to manage their own programs 
and allocate their own resources. Wide per capita differences in transfers to different 
provinces was also a source of discontent. 
In 1977 the federal financing of hospital insurance, medicare, and post-secondary 
education was put on a new footing. Since the programs were "established" and their 
continuation was assured by public support, the Federal Government eliminated its cost 
shared grants and introduced the Established Programs Financing under then Part VI 
now part V of the Fiscal Arrangements Act. Under this program, the Federal 
Government provides a "block fund" transfer that the provinces can allocate according 
to their own spending priorities. 
Some constraints were imposed on the provinces by the 1984 Canada Health Act 
which clarified standards already in the legislation. Under the previous legislation, the 
only possible penalty for a province violating program standards was the termination of 
the entire transfer. Under the CHA, the response was more measured and health 
payments were required to be withheld dollar for dollar for any provinces that allowed 
doctors to extra bill or established user fees. 
The EPF transfer takes the form of an equal per capita payment to the 
provinces. The total payment is calculated by multiplying the per capita payment by the 
province's population. Each province's per capita EPF entitlement is determined by 
multiplying the national per capita federal contribution for insured health services and 
for post-secondary education in 1975-76, plus an added amount for extended health care 
services in 1977-78, by an escalation factor based on economic growth. The escalator 
was originally a lagged three year moving average of growth in per capita gross national 
product. But it was reduced to the rate of growth of GNP less 2 percentage points in 
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the May 1986 budget and GNP less 3 percentage points in the April 1989 budget. The 
February 1990 budget announced the government's intention to freeze the per capita 
EPF transfer in 1990-91 and 1991-92 at its 1989-90 level. Bill C-69 implementing this 
change provides for a resumption of EPF growth in 1992-93 at the rate of growth of 
GNP less 3 percentage points. 
The EPF transfer consists of two relatively equal parts - tax points and cash 
payments. The tax points are 13.5 personal income tax points, and 1 corporate tax point. 
The net gain to the provinces in 1977 amounted to 9.143 tax points since 4.357 points of 
personal income tax and 1 point of corporate tax had already been transferred to the 
provinces under the former financing arrangements for post-secondary education. The 
value of the tax points is subtracted from the value of the total payment to yield the 
cash payment. 
2.2.4 Fiscal Stabilization 
Under Part II of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act the Federal 
Government agrees to provide fiscal stabilization payments to the provinces if their 
revenue subject to stabilization declines. Since 1987 part of the federal contribution 
has been made in the form of cash and part in the form of a loan. While payments have 
only been made twice under this provision since it was instituted in 1957 (B.C. in 
respect of 1982-83 and Alberta in respect of 1986-87), it is generally regarded to be 
useful because of the importance attached to it by credit rating agencies and lenders. 
2.2.5 Canada Assistance Plan 
The Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) is the largest fiscal transfer program after 
EPF and Equalization and is only remaining major shared-cost program. It does not 
come under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, but under its own separate 
act. 
In 1990-91 CAP cash expenditures are expected to be $5.2 billion. Counting the 
tax transfer to Quebec of $618 million, total CAP expenditures are forecast to be $5.8 
billion in 1990-91. 
CAP supplanted four major provincial shared-cost programs in the area of social 
welfare in 1966 when the Canada Assistance Plan Act and Regulation took effect. These 
programs were Old Age Assistance, Blind Persons Allowances, Disabled Persons 
Allowance, and Unemployment Assistance. The Federal Government had financed 50 per 
cent of all these programs except for Blind Persons Allowance where its share was 75 
per cent. CAP expands the assistance available from these four categories to more 
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generally providing special assistance to persons in need, or likely to become in need, 
welfare assistance to persons in need, and supporting work activity projects. 
CAP follows the design of its predecessors. Under it the Federal Government 
reimburses the provinces for 50 per cent of the cost of all eligible provincial 
expenditures for special assistance to the needy and for welfare. The eligibility 
conditions as set out in the preamble to the Act are relatively lenient. Assistance must 
be provided on the basis of "need". It must adequately reflect the basic requirements of 
the recipients for food, clothing, shelter and other necessities. Also no residency tests 
can be employed. Within these broad guidelines provinces are free to establish their own 
rates and categories of assistance. Until the last budget CAP transfers have been open-
ended, but this is no longer the case. 
The February 1990 budget announced the government's intention to limit the 
growth in CAP transfers to provinces not receiving equalization (Ontario, British 
Columbia, and Alberta) to 5 per cent for 1990-91 and 1991-92 and only to resume full 50 
per cent cost sharing for all provinces in 1992-93. The British Columbia government 
challenged before the courts the Federal Government's right to impose such a limit 
without giving the required one-year notice specified in the agreements with the 
provinces, and was supported by the governments of Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled this summer that the CAP agreement and 
the way it has functioned "give rise to a legitimate expectation that the Government of 
Canada would introduce no bill into Parliament to limit its obligation without the 
consent of British Columbia." The Federal Government is appealing the B.C. ruling. 8 
2.3 THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH SHARED-COST PROGRAMS 
Conditional grant programs have been part of federal-provincial financial 
relations since 1913. Shared-cost programs proliferated after World War II. Conditional 
grants grew from $46 million in 1945 to $1.2 billion in 1965 before the introduction of 
CAP, to $6.7 billion in 1975 before the EPF transfer to the provinces. After 1977 
conditional grants declined significantly and stood at $6.3 billion in 1990-91. 
At the end of World War I conditional grants were given for assistance for 
highways, technical education, the control of diseases, and the maintenance of 
employment offices. Some of the most important programs introduced after World War 
II by the Federal Government were: health grants in 1948; the Trans-Canada Highway in 
1950; social welfare programs such as old age assistance, disabled persons' allowances 
8 Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan [1990] B.C.J. No. 1377, June 15, 1990. 
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works in 1958; new grants for technical and vocational training in 1960; economic 
development grants such as ARDA and FRED in the 1960s; and medicare in 1968. The 
1960s were the heyday of conditional grants. 
The Federal Government's experience with shared-cost programs has not been 
entirely satisfactory in all respects. The Rowell-Sirois Commission warned that 
" ...the conditional grant, as it works under Canadian 
conditions, is an inherently unsatisfactory device... the 
experience with conditional grants leads us to doubt whether 
joint administration of activities by the Dominion and a 
province is ever a satisfactory way of surmounting 
1 constitutional difficulties." 9  
Donald Smiley, writing in 1963, was critical of conditional grants on the grounds 
that they violate the principle of provincial accountability, infringe provincial 
autonomy, and create distortions in the spending patterns of the provinces. He 
recommended that the then present arrangements relating to public health, 
hospitalization and resource development should be liquidated. But he also acknowledged 
that "With all their defects, conditional grants have brought an invaluable element of 
adaptability to a federal structure which has proved remarkably resistant to change 
through constitutional amendment or evolving patterns of judicial review." 10 
George Carter in his comprehensive review of Canadian conditional grants 
published in 1971 reported the main provincial criticisms of conditional grants and noted 
the then federal proposals to introduce block funding in the fields of health and social 
welfare. 
Dissatisfaction with shared-cost programs was widespread. Quebec had a long 
drawn out controversy with the Federal Government over university grants in the 1950s. 
Other provinces joined Quebec at the Dominion-Provincial Conference in 1960 in 
opposing the grants in principle in the case of well-established programs. At a Federal-
Provincial Conference in 1964 the Federal Government put forward its offer to allow 
provinces to contract out of well-established programs involving regular expenditures. 
Only Quebec took up the offer at the time, but in 1977 with Established Program 
Financing health and post-secondary education grants were transformed from 
conditional grants into unconditional. In 1978 a bill was even introduced that would have 
changed the social service component of CAP into a block grant similar to EPF. By the 
end of the 1970s the pendulum had clearly swung away from shared cost programs. The 
Canada Assistance Program was the only remaining major shared cost program. 
9 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report, p.259. 
10 Donald V. Smiley, Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism, 
 pp.65-72. 
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2.4 DISASTER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Disaster Financial Assistance arrangements are of interest to those concerned 
with developing shared-cost programs in agriculture. They were set up in 1970 to help 
provincial governments with the costs of dealing with disasters. The most common types 
of disasters are floods and tornadoes and other storms. The arrangements, which are 
administered by Emergency Preparedness Canada, have no enabling legislation and the 
payments take the form of ex gratia payments to provincial governments. The 
arrangements are thus very flexible. Provinces are required to ask the Federal 
Government for assistance in a letter. The Federal Government then decides whether 
assistance will be provided based on criteria contained in a Manual. 
The assistance is designed to help provinces to get individuals, small business and 
municipalities back on their feet after a disaster. The assistance is not intended to 
compensate fully for losses from disasters. The assistance does not generally cover 
anything that is or could be insured. Assistance to the provinces is usually provided well 
after the provinces have made the disbursements to the victims of the disaster. This 
allows the Federal Government time to determine what provincial expenditures are 
eligible and to audit the expenditures. The formula for cost-sharing is that the province 
bears the first $1 per capita in assistance, the next $2 up to $3 per capita is split 50/50, 
the next $2 up to $5 per capita is divided 75 per cent federal and 25 per cent provincial, 
and any amount over $5 per capita is borne 90 per cent by the Federal Government. 
Some provinces have tried to have general drought assistance covered by the 
arrangements, but the Federal Government has refused. 
The amount of assistance provided to the provinces under Disaster Financial 
Assistance has not been large. Since 1970 the federal government has paid out $160 
million in assistance. This year $4 or $5 million in assistance is expected to be provided. 
The Federal Government is currently considering a request from the British Columbia 
Government for assistance of $10 to $15 million to help deal with the recent B.C. flood. 
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2.5 TRENDS AND PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTIONS IN FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL 
TRANSFERS 
Detailed tables on federal-provincial transfers are provided in an appendix to this 
paper. 
The three major federal transfer programs have grown at an average annual rate 
of around 8 per cent over the decade ending this year (Chart 3 and 4). This is slightly 
more rapidly than the growth in program expenditures (budgetary expenditures less 
public debt charges) and about one percentage point less than the growth in budgetary 
expenditures. EPF has increased less rapidly than the other two programs and CAP more 
rapidly. On average the major transfer programs grew most quickly in the first three 
years of the decade slowing in 1984-85 and subsequent years. EPF slowed after 1985-86 
because of the reductions in the escalator introduced as part of government efforts to 
reduce the deficit. Equalization declined in 1985-86 as transitional payments to smooth 
the move to the 1982 formula ended and payments to Quebec, Manitoba and Nova Scotia 
fell, but then experienced three years of very strong growth as payments resumed their 
growth in these provinces. On average, the three major federal transfer programs grew 
5.8 per cent per year over the 1984-85 to 1990-91 period. This is more rapid than the 
3.6 per cent growth rate of federal total expenditures over the same period. 
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Over a longer time period, the growth of equalization is more striking. 
Equalization entitlements totalled only $139.1 million in 1957-58 the year the program 
was introduced. By 1980-81 Equalization had reached $3.7 billion, registering an annual 
rate of growth over twenty two years of over 16 per cent much more rapid than the 10 
1/2 per cent average growth recorded by GNP. Growth was especially rapid over the 
period of the 1962-67 and 1972-77 fiscal arrangements. 
The distribution of Canada's population across the provinces is shown in Chart 5. 
This provides a standard of comparison for the distribution of the main transfer 
programs. EPF is distributed the same as population. But Equalization is concentrated in 
the lower income provinces (Chart 6). Quebec will receive almost a half of equalization 
payments in 1990-91, which is much greater than its 26 per cent share of population. On 
a per capita basis, however, payments to Quebec are much lower than those to the 
Atlantic provinces and Manitoba. The Atlantic provinces with less than 9 per cent of the 
population will receive over a third of equalization. Manitoba will receive two and a 
half times its population share in equalization. Saskatchewan will receive a 60 per cent 
greater share of equalization than of population. Its per capita entitlement is the lowest 
of the provinces. 
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The distribution of CAP payments is much closer to population than are 
equalization payments (Chart 7). The most striking divergences are for Quebec which 
gets a much larger share than its population and for Ontario which gets a smaller. It is 
also noteworthy that except for New Brunswick all of the Atlantic provinces and 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba get a smaller share of CAP payments than their share of 
population. 
CHART 7 
PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
CAP PAYMENTS 1990-91 
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2.6 THE ISSUE OF FISCAL IMBALANCE 
The issue of an imbalance between spending responsibilities and revenue sources 
has been a perennial one in Canadian fiscal history. An imbalance is said to occur when 
one level of government begins to run a persistent deficit or surplus in its account. 
During the 1960s provincial governments argued that they had responsibility for the 
most rapidly growing areas of public expenditures, namely health and education, but 
that their revenue sources were less elastic than the federal government's. 
Consequently, the provinces expected a tendency for growing deficits to be manifest at 
the provincial level and surpluses at the federal level. This problem was alleviated by 
the transfer of tax points to the provinces in the 1960s. In 1982 following the 
emergence of a massive federal deficit, the previous federal government contended that 
a structural imbalance exists at the federal level. 11 
 The current federal government 
compared its deficit, debt charges and debt with those of the provinces in the 1990 
budget. 12 The need to reduce the federal deficit has served as the rationale for cut-
backs in the growth of federal transfer payments to provinces. 
The Economic Council argued that the issue of fiscal imbalance can not be called 
a long-term structural economic problem since both levels of government in Canada 
have access to all major revenue sources. But they acknowledged that the issue of 
imbalance requires hard political and social choices and that deficit reduction will 
require unpopular reductions in expenditures or increases in taxes. 13 
A comparison of the per capita federal and provincial fiscal balances in fiscal 
years 1989-90 and 1990-91 on a Financial Management System Basis is provided in Chart 
8. The fiscal balances in 1990-91 are based on a coding of this year's spring round of 
federal and provincial budgets and hence does not incorporate the impact of recent 
developments such as the likelihood of a recession and the sharp run-up in the 
international price of oil. 
11 This view was put forward by Finance Minister Allan J. MacEachen in a brief to 
the Breau Task Force. See Allan J. MacEachen, "Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements in the Eighties," p.19. 
12 Minister of Finance, The Budget, February 20, 1990, pp.122-130. 
13 Economic Council of Canada, Financing Confederation, p.7. 
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The extent to which the federal deficit at $1,160 per capita in 1989-90 and 
$1,068 in 1990-91 is higher than that of any of the provinces is striking. Even this 
modest improvement in the federal deficit is becoming increasingly unlikely given the 
prospect of recession. The only province with a deficit approaching that of the federal 
government was Alberta in 1989-90. But the Alberta deficit is projected to come down 
sharply in 1990-91. If the recent increase in the price of oil were taken into account, 
the Alberta deficit in 1990-91 would be transformed into a surplus. The deterioration of 
the Saskatchewan deficit in 1990-91 is worrisome. The recent run-up in the price of oil 
will raise revenues in Saskatchewan, but the increased revenue will be offset by 
decreases in equalization. The non-oil producing provinces are likely to experience a 
deterioration in their deficit in 1990-91 from that estimated in the chart. 
22 
An important indicator of the strength of fiscal position is public debt charges as 
a percentage of revenue or the interest/revenue ratio. It is the inverse of the interest 
coverage ratio. Chart 9 shows that interest charges account for a much higher 
proportion of revenue for the Federal Government than for any of the provincial 
governments. Public debt charges account for 34 1/2 per cent of revenue for the 
Federal Government compared to only about 12 1/2 per cent for the provincial 
governments. Only Saskatchewan and Manitoba have significantly higher percentages. 
The burden of financing public debt charges is clearly much greater for the Federal 
Government than for any of the provincial governments. 
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While the deficits and interest/revenue ratios of the provinces are relatively 
smaller than those of the Federal Government, it is important to recognize that the 
ability of provincial governments to finance the deficit is also much less. Nevertheless, 
even taking this into consideration, it is evident that the fiscal position of the Federal 
Government is significantly worse than that of the provinces. 
2.7 THE FISCAL CAPACITY OF PROVINCES 
There are several measures of the relative fiscal position of provinces. The first 
is the relative "fiscal capacity" of a province. It is a measure of the ability of a 
province to get revenue from available sources and is calculated both for own source 
revenues and own source revenues plus equalization. The second is the relative "tax 
effort" of a province. This is a measure of the revenue that a province raises relative to 
the revenue it would raise if it were to levy taxes at the average provincial rates. These 
measures have been provided by the Federal Provincial Relations Division of the 
Department of Finance. 
The measure of relative fiscal capacity from own sources is shown in Table 1. It 
is estimated for each province by taking the per capita yield of own source revenues 
from a standardized tax system, which applies a uniform tax rate to a uniform tax base 
for each revenue source. Own source revenue excludes interest revenues of provincial 
governments, all non-tax revenues of local governments, and federal transfer payments. 
The large variation in relative fiscal capacity from own source revenues across 
provinces and the stability in recent years of the provincial positions is evident from the 
table. The strong position of Alberta stemming from oil and gas revenues with an index 
of 136 is noteworthy. While this is down from a level of well over 200 in the late 1970s, 
it is still head and shoulders above the other provinces and more than twice the level in 
Newfoundland and PEI, the lowest income provinces. The disparity will grow when the 
recent oil price increase is factored into the 1990-91 estimates. The position of 
Saskatchewan should also strengthen with higher oil prices though to a much lesser 
extent. 
Table 2 shows that equalization substantially reduces the disparity in fiscal 
capacity among provinces. While Alberta remains much higher, the disparity among the 
other nine provinces decreases markedly when equalization is taken into account and 
falls within an 11 percentage point range. Equalization brings all of the equalization 
receiving provinces up to the same level. Again the impact of the recent increase in the 
price of petroleum has not been taken into account in the 1990-91 estimates. When it is, 
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the position of Alberta should strengthen. For example to provide an order of magnitude 
estimate of the likely impact, a $10 per barrel increase in the price of oil translates 
roughly into an additional $1 billion in revenue for Alberta. Saskatchewan will also 
experience an increase in revenue, but it will be offset by a decrease in equalization. 
An indicator of tax effort is provided in Table 3. It is calculated by dividing the 
revenues a province actually receives by the revenues that the representative tax 
system would yield in the province at average provincial rates. Tax effort varies 
considerably across provinces. The lowest level of tax effort at 72.7 per cent is in 
Alberta; the highest level of tax effort at 112.0 per cent is in Quebec. The Prairie 
provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba at 104 and 105 per cent have relatively high 
levels of tax effort. The Atlantic provinces except for Newfoundland have lower than 
average levels of tax effort. The increase in the level of tax effort in Ontario from 
below the all provinces average in 1987-88 to above in 1990-91 is striking, especially 
given the importance of tax increases in Ontario in pulling up the national average. The 
decrease in the relatively high tax burden in Quebec over the same period is also 
noteworthy. If tax effort was adjusted for the surpluses and deficits, the disparity in tax 
effort would widen since large deficits tend to be correlated with high tax effort. 
Unfortunately, data on the adjusted measure of tax effort is not available. 
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TABLE 1 
INDICES OF PROVINCIAL LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY 
OWN SOURCE REVENUES 
1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 
Nf Id 60.4 61.9 62.4 62.6 
PEI 64.1 64.5 64.5 64.6 
NS 75.9 75.4 75.9 76.0 
NB 71.2 71.3 71.1 71.2 
Que 85.4 85.7 85.7 85.8 
Ont 108.2 110.4 110.3 109.8 
Man 80.2 80.1 80.6 80.7 
Sask 90.3 87.3 86.6 87.7 
Alta 145.6 134.9 135.6 136.2 
BC 103.9 105.4 104.5 103.9 
All Prov. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Federal Provincial Relations Division, Finance 
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TABLE 2 
INDICES OF PROVINCIAL LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY 
OWN SOURCE REVENUES PLUS EQUALIZATION 
1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 
Nfld 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
PEI 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
NS 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
NB 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
Que 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
Ont 101.3 103.3 103.4 102.9 
Man 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
Sask 91.8 91.8 91.7 92.1 
Alta 136.3 126.3 127.1 127.6 
BC 97.2 98.7 97.9 97.3 
All Prov. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Federal Provincial Relations Division, Finance 
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TABLE 3 
INDICES OF PROVINCIAL-LOCAL TAX EFFORT 
ACTUAL REVENUES 
1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 
Nf Id 108.1 106.0 99.8 99.6 
PEI 95.2 96.0 91.9 92.1 
NS 94.7 91.4 89.1 89.4 
NB 91.7 97.8 98.5 98.4 
Que 118.9 116.1 112.4 112.0 
Ont 98.3 100.1 102.6 104.2 
Man 115.1 111.7 106.3 105.0 
Sask 104.5 103.1 107.0 104.0 
Alta 77.4 72.4 73.6 72.7 
BC 92.4 96.9 95.7 93.5 
All Prov. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Federal Provincial Relations Division, Finance 
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2.8 THE EXPENDITURE NEEDS OF PROVINCES 
Indexes of consolidated provincial-local expenditure per capita for all of the 
provinces for the fiscal year 1986-87 (the latest year currently available on a 
consolidated basis) are given in Table 4. These indexes are calculated by taking the 
ratio of per capita expenditures in a particular province to the all Canada average. It is 
notable that the variation in per capita spending is much less than fiscal capacity. 
Provinces tend to provide broadly comparable levels of public services. The greatest 
expenditure effort according to this measure is made by Alberta and the least by the 
Atlantic provinces. Quebec and Saskatchewan also have a relatively high level of 
expenditure effort. The spending effort of no province is so high relative to its fiscal 
capacity that it can not afford to participate in any shared-cost program likely to be 
introduced. 
The amount that provinces spend on agriculture varies from province to province 
(Table 5). The provinces that spend the most per capita are Saskatchewan, Alberta, and 
Prince Edward Island. (Manitoba would also be a relatively big spender, but the 1990-91 
budget for spending on agriculture is not yet available from Statistics Canada on a 
intergovernmentally comparable Financial Management System Basis.) Quebec spend 
more than three times as much as Ontario on a per capita basis. An important point to 
note is that while the amount spent on agriculture varies significantly from province to 
province, even the provinces with the heaviest expenditures spend a relatively small 
portion of their budgets on agriculture. Thus no province can legitimately complain that 
it spends so much on agricultural programs that it can not to afford to participate in 
any of the shared-cost programs likely to be proposed. 
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TABLE 4 
INDEX OF CONSOLIDATED 
PROVINCIAL-LOCAL EXPENDITURE 
PER CAPITA IN 1986-87 
Province 1986-87 
Alberta 130 
Quebec 109 
Saskatchewan 108 
Manitoba 103 
Newfoundland 91 
Ontario 90 
British Columbia 88 
New Brunswick 84 
Nova Scotia 83 
Prince Edward Island 80 
All Prov. 100 
SOURCE: Statistics Canada, Financial 
Management System. 
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TABLE 5 
AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURE BY PROVINCES 
IN 1990-91 
Thousands 
of 
Dollars 
Dollars 
Per Capita 
Per Cent 
of 
Average 
Share of 
Total 
Spending 
Nf Id 16,264 28.38 38 0.49 
PEI 32,039 245.70 325 4.40 
NB 43,867 49.20 65 0.97 
NB 37,883 52.33 69 0.94 
Que 626,422 92.64 123 1.63 
Ont 280,767 28.85 38 0.59 
Man NA NA NA NA 
Sask 257,210 257.13 340 4.59 
Alta 560,548 226.96 300 3.71 
BC 70,084 22.38 30 0.41 
All Prov. ex 
Man 
1,926,371 75.56 100 1.41 
SOURCE: : Statistics Canada, Financial Management System. Manitoba 
data is not available for 1990-91, because a provincial election delayed 
the presentation of the budget until fall. 
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3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
AGRICULTURE 
3.1 THE RELEVANCE FOR AGRICULTURE OF GENERAL AND OTHER SECTORAL 
TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
The main fiscal transfer programs are relevant for shared-cost programs in 
agriculture in different ways. 
1) Equalization has a direct bearing on the fiscal capacity of provinces and their 
abilities to participate in shared-cost programs in agriculture. 
2) EPF provides an example of how difficulties can arise with shared cost-
programs in health and education and how such programs can be transformed into 
a block conditional grant with their own particular problems. 
3) CAP is the largest ongoing shared-cost program. 
The experience with other sectoral shared-cost programs also has lessons for the 
agriculture sector. It is important that agricultural shared-cost programs be based on 
the same set of principles as other shared-cost programs. Otherwise precedents set in 
the area of agriculture could be used by the provinces in arguing for major changes in 
the basis of other shared-cost programs. 
A proper understanding of the what equalization does should lay to rest any 
concerns that provinces do not have the fiscal capacity to participate in agricultural 
shared cost programs. Equalization raises the fiscal capacity of the lowest income 
provinces to about 92 per cent of the national average level. After equalization, the 
fiscal capacities of all the provinces with the exception of Alberta are clustered in a 
relatively narrow range. Thus no province can argue convincingly that its revenue base 
is so weak that it can not afford to participate in an agricultural shared cost program. 
This leaves the issue of whether any particular province might have such great 
expenditure needs that it can not afford to participate in agricultural shared cost 
programs. An examination of expenditure effort as measured by per capita provincial 
expenditures relative to the national average indicates that the variation in per capita 
expenditures is less than the variation of fiscal capacity. In addition, while it is true 
that provinces such as Saskatchewan and Manitoba spend relatively heavily on 
agricultural programs, they spend less in other areas and agricultural spending does not 
account for a large proportion of their budget. A thorough analysis of provincial 
expenditure needs would be extremely difficult and quite controversial. It would also 
require a sizable federal-provincial task force working many years to produce conclusive 
results and is well beyond the scope of this study. For the present, suffice it to say that 
there is no evidence that the expenditure needs are so heavy in any of the provinces 
that they can not afford to participate in agricultural shared-cost programs. 
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3.2 ISSUES ARISING FROM SHARED-COST PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE 
3.2.1 The Constitutional Basis for Shared-Cost Programs in Agriculture 
Section 95 of the Constitution Act 1867 specifies that agriculture is a concurrent 
responsibility. Either the federal or provincial governments thus may exercise 
jurisdiction in relation to agriculture. However, if a conflict of legislation occurs, the 
federal law prevails. The Federal Government has been heavily involved in agriculture 
since Confederation in order to pursue the national interest in this key sector. The 
Prairie grain economy has been a beneficiary of Federal government initiatives since its 
inception. The Federal Government was responsible for building the railway that opened 
the Prairies and for encouraging immigration. In the crisis of the 1930s the Federal 
Government took several important steps. In 1929 it assumed the debts of provincial 
grain pools. In 1935 the Canadian Wheat Board was set up to handle the international 
marketing of Canadian grain. Since this clearly invaded provincial jurisdiction over 
intra-provincial marketing and the elevator system in western Canada, it had to be done 
under Section 92 (10c) of the Constitution Act 1867 under which the Federal 
Government can declare anything to be in the federal jurisdiction as long as it is for the 
"general Advantage of Canada...or of Two or more of the Provinces. I/14 The Prairie 
Farm Assistance Act, which was passed in 1939, to protect the Prairies against future 
droughts by creating a fund to pay for crop loss indemnities financed in part by a 1-per-
cent levy on producers, was also justified on this basis. These actions led to a de facto 
recognition of the primary role of the Federal Government for agriculture on the 
Prairies. There was no real , resistance from the provinces because they did not have the 
fiscal capacity to take on the task themselves. 
The Federal Government also has a responsibility for agriculture under the "trade 
and commerce" clause of the Constitution Act 1867( Section 91 (2), under which control 
over international and interprovincial trade are assigned to the Federal Government. 
This provides the Federal Government with a clear mandate for its jurisdiction over 
international and interprovincial marketing. 
Research is another recognized area where the Federal Government has 
exercised leadership. The development of Marquis wheat and canola are but two of the 
better known success stories for Federal agricultural research. Provincial governments 
also maintain agricultural research establishments. 
14  This declaration was found to be constitutionally valid by the courts in Jorgensen 
v. Attorney General Canada, [19711 S.C.R. 725. 
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The transfer of fiscal capacity to the provinces under the Fiscal Arrangements in 
the post-war period has strengthened the ability of provinces to assume a larger role in 
the development of agriculture and the provision of safety nets within their own 
provincial boundaries. 
The establishment of marketing boards under the Canadian Dairy Commission 
Act of 1966 and the Farm Product Marketing Agencies Act of 1971 was accomplished by 
joining the federal and provincial powers together to create national marketing boards 
with delegated powers. Resort to Section 91(10c) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was no 
longer an acceptable modus operandi as it was for the establishment of the Canadian 
Wheat Board. An earlier effort to establish marketing legislation under the Natural 
Products Marketing Act of 1934 had been declared ultra vires. 
Under Section 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 provinces are given responsibility 
for education. This has been interpreted to include agricultural extension. 
The Federal Government can also use conditional grants to induce the provincial 
governments to undertake desired actions in areas of provincial responsibilities. In 
accordance with its "spending power" the federal government is free to spend its tax 
dollars any way it likes. 
The Federal Government in a 1969 policy paper noted that "the power of 
Parliament to legislate has been interpreted by the courts as giving it the power to 
spend on any object providing the legislative authority does not amount to a regulatory 
scheme falling under provincial powers." It is based on Section 91(3) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 which gives Parliament the power to raise money by any mode or system of 
taxation and on Section 91(1A) which gives Parliament the right to make laws 
respecting the public debt and property. The latter clause has been construed to include 
all Federal Government assets including the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 15 
The precedent setting case on which the courts have pronounced on the 
constitutionality of conditional grants concerns the reference regarding the Employment 
and Social Insurance Act of 1935. There has not been much adjudication on the 
constitutionality of conditional grants because provinces, which are the parties most 
affected, have preferred to settle their differences with the Federal Government 
through federal-provincial negotiations. The most widely quoted part of the decision of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reads: 
"That the Dominion may impose taxation for the purpose of 
creating a fund for special purposes, and may apply that fund 
15 	 • Pierre Trudeau, Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending Power of Parliament, 
p.12. 
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for making contributions in the public interest to individuals, 
corporations or public authorities could not as a general 
proposition be denied ... But assuming that the Dominion has 
collected by means of taxation a fund it by no means follows 
that any legislation which disposes of it is necessarily within 
Dominion competence. 
It may still be legislation affecting the classes of subjects 
enumerated in Section 92, and, if so, would be ultra vires. In 
other words, Dominion legislation, even though it deals with 
Dominion property, may yet be so framed as to invade civil 
rights within the province; or to encroach upon the classes of 
subjects which are reserved to Dominion competence. It is 
not necessary that it should be a colourable device or 
pretence. If on the true view of the legislation it is found 
that in reality in pith and substance the legislation invades 
civil rights within the province, or in respect of other classes 
of subjects otherwise encroaches on the provincial field, the 
legislation will be invalid. To hold otherwise would afford 
the Dominion an easy passage into the provincial 
domain." 16 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's general upholding of the spending 
power combined with vague qualifications have given rise to controversy on the 
constitutional limits of federal spending power. On the one hand, Bora Laskin and G.V. 
La Forest have argued that the Federal Government can make grants to the province 
for any purpose as long as they do not amount to legislation or regulation in an area of 
provincial jurisdiction. 7 Frank Scott has claimed that the spending power is based on 
the royal prerogative and equated spending with giving. On the other hand, the Quebec 
Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems argued in the early 1950s that 
qualifications in the decision preclude grants in areas of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction. 18 In the middle are those who argue that it is all right to provide grants as 
long as specific taxes are not levied or funds established to finance the grant. 
16 As quoted in Donald Smiley, Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism, p.19. 
The "Winterhaven Stables" case heard by the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in 1985 
and appealed to the Supreme Court in 1988 provides a recent confirmation of the 
Federal role. 
17 Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1966), p.666 and 
G.V. La Forest, The Allocation of Taxing Powers Under the Canadian Constitution  
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1967), pp.36-41. 
18 Discussed in Pierre Trudeau, Federal Provincial Grants, p.114. 
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In its 1969 policy paper the Federal Government contended that there should be 
two important limitations on the use of the spending power. First, there should be a 
broad national consensus supporting its use; second, there should be no fiscal penalty on 
provinces that choose not to participate. 19 
There is widespread support for the principle that provinces that choose not to 
participate in a national shared-cost program in an area of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction should be offered reasonable compensation provided that the province 
carries on a program or initiative that is compatible with national objectives. This 
option to "opt out," which was modelled on that offered in 1965 for several shared-cost 
programs and taken up by Quebec, was to have been formally introduced as an 
amendment to the constitution under the Meech Lake Accord (Section 106a). 
While the Federal Government can clearly use its spending powers to make 
conditional grants to the provinces, it is not necessary in the case of most agricultural 
programs because the Federal and provincial governments share joint jurisdiction over 
agriculture. 
The recent decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal in the reference regarding the 
Canada Assistance Plan has important implications for shared-cost programs, including 
those in agriculture. The Federal Government announced its intention in the February 
1990 budget to limit the growth in payments under CAP to the non-equalization 
receiving provinces to 5 per cent per year for the next two years. This limitation was 
introduced in House of Commons in Bill C-69, the Government Expenditure Restraint 
Act. The B.C. Attorney General referred this matter to the B.C. Court of Appeal 
pursuant to the Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C. 1979. Specifically, the Court was 
asked to pronounce on two questions: 
(1) Has the Government of Canada any statutory prerogative or contractual 
authority to limit its obligation under the Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1970, 
C-1 and its Agreement with the Government of British Columbia dated March 23, 
1967, to contribute 50 per cent of the cost to British Columbia of assistance and 
welfare services? 
(2) Do the terms of the Agreement dated March 23, 1967 between the 
Governments of Canada and British Columbia, the subsequent conduct of the 
Government of Canada pursuant to the Agreements and the provisions of the 
Canada Assistance Plan Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1, give rise to a legitimate 
expectation that the Government of Canada will introduce no bill into Parliament 
to limit its obligation under the Agreement or the Act without the consent of 
19 Pierre Trudeau, Federal Provincial Grants, p.38. 
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British Columbia? 2° 
The majority of the court represented by three of the five judges (Toy J.A., 
Hinkson J.A., and Legg J.A.) answered "No" to the first question and "Yes" to the 
second in their joint opinion written by Toy J.A.. A fourth judge, Lambert J.A. gave the 
same answer, but for different reasons. The fifth judge, Southin J.A., agreed with the 
majorities answer to the first question, but answered "No" to the second question. 
The consensus on the first question that the Federal Government did not have 
any statutory prerogative or contractual authority to limit its obligation under the 
Canada Assistance Plan Act stemmed from the fact that Bill C-69 had not yet been 
passed by Parliament. Counsel for the Federal Government did not contest this point. 
The majority opinion on the second question hinged on the doctrine of "legitimate 
expectations" that has been evolving in both England and Canada over the last 30 years 
to protect individuals from arbitrary administrative actions of government. The 
majority argued that the B.C. Government had a private law right or "legitimate 
expectation" under the terms of the plan and the agreement that the Federal 
Government would not amend the agreement except by mutual consent or unless 
terminated by consent or on one year's notice. The introduction of Bill C-69 to amend 
the agreement constitutes a "procedural impropriety." They rejected the Federal 
Government's argument that the court should not answer question 2 since it was a 
political rather than a legal question. 
The majority acknowledged a reservation that "Circumstances could arise where 
the Cabinet in exercising its executive functions might be justified in precipitately 
acting without consent and with minimal consultation with the Province of British 
Columbia and the other provinces that have signed similar agreements." 21 
The fourth judge, Lambert J.A., took a much harder line in answering the second 
question. He concluded that "the federal proposal to place a cap of 5 per cent on 
increases in the contributions by Canada to the cost of providing assistance to those in 
need in British Columbia would if carried out constitute a breach by Canada of an 
undertaking given by Canada, and a breach of an obligation imposed on Canada by the 
terms of a federal-provincial agreement, voluntarily entered into." He stated, however, 
that he did not think that the Federal Government had intentionally decided to breach 
its undertaking or obligation. 22 
20 Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan [1990] B.C.J. No. 1377, June 15, 1990, 
pp.1-2. 
21 Ibid, p.15. 
22 Ibid, p.33-34. 
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The fifth judge, Southin J.A., disagreed strongly with the other judges answer to 
question 2 and sided with the Federal Government in his dissenting opinion. He argues 
that there is no limitation on the executive power of Parliament and rejects the 
arguments that would "engraft into the Executive Power of the Constitution Acts a 
doctrine of 'legitimate expectation'." 23 
The Federal Government is appealing the decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. In the meantime the decision stands and has important 
implications for all shared-cost programs, including those in agriculture. The Federal 
Government should recognize that as long as the decision stands it can not unilaterally 
alter the terms of shared-cost agreements unless the agreements themselves have 
clauses allowing the Federal Government to do so. 
3.2.2 The Rationale for Shared-Cost Programs in Agriculture 
It is in the national interest for the Federal government to introduce shared-cost 
programs in agriculture. First, the Federal Government has a responsibility for 
agriculture under Section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Second, the Federal 
Government has responsibility for trade and commerce. Shared-cost programs can be 
necessary to support the Federal Government's international trade objectives as are 
pursued through GATT and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The agriculture 
sector can be damaged by the trade policies followed by other countries. The Federal 
Government may need to provide assistance to farmers to maintain their international 
competitiveness and to protect Canada's market share against heavily subsidized 
competition such as Canada is now facing in the international grain market. Third, 
shared-cost programs may be necessary to provide income support to farmers that other 
Canadians derive from Unemployment Insurance for which farmers are not eligible. 
Fourth, adjustment to economic forces such as are being required of the Prairie grain 
economy should be viewed as a national objective and, thus, demands Federal 
government involvement. 
The traditional economic argument in favour of shared-cost programs in general 
is that the benefits of the program extend beyond the provincial borders. 24 If this is 
23 Ibid, p.40. 
24 The theory of federal states suggests governmental activities should be organized 
at the lowest level at which the costs and benefits of the activities can be internalized. 
This permits the welfare of citizens to be maximized by allowing those with similar 
preferences for public goods to group together. In this way federal states are better 
than unitary. However, to the extent that it is not possible completely to internalize all 
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the case, equating the marginal cost of the program to its benefits will not result in the 
optimal amount of expenditures on the program. For instance, if benefits extend beyond 
the borders as with health and education, too little will be spent on the program. In this 
case, the appropriate federal shared-cost share would be equal to the proportion of the 
benefits falling outside the province. The likelihood that only a small proportion of 
benefits would spill over has lead some observers such as Boadway to question if the 
50/50 sharing typical of shared-cost programs was overly generous. 25 Gramlich has 
argued that in the United States where spillovers should be greater because of the 
smaller relative size of junior governments the contribution of the federal government 
should rarely exceed 20 per cent. 26 
A second argument in favour of shared-cost programs is that there is a need in 
certain key areas such as health, education and welfare for the Federal Government to 
establish national standards. The need for national standards can be justified in terms of 
spillovers or more broadly in terms of an overriding national interest. 
A third argument is based on the notion that there is an imbalance in the taxing 
powers and spending responsibilities of the two levels of government with the federal 
government possessing the lion's share of tax sources and the provincial governments 
the greatest spending responsibilities in such costly areas as health and education. While 
it is true that the provinces are limited by the Constitution Act 1867 to levying direct 
taxes whereas the Federal Government is not subject to any such restriction, in practice 
the provinces have not really been constrained in their ability to raise revenues. They 
have only been barred from levying tariffs on goods from other provinces or abroad, 
imposing taxes on non-residents, and levying sales taxes before the retail level. The 
broad taxing powers of the provincial governments in conjunction with the divergent 
trends in federal and provincial deficits have undermined the imbalance argument in 
favour of shared-cost programs. 
A fourth argument is based on the concept of fiscal equity. In accordance with 
costs and benefits within jurisdictional areas, it is necessary to have the central 
government impose taxes and subsidies to force subsidiary governments to take into 
account external costs and benefits in their decisions concerning the provision of public 
goods. The economic theory of federalism is presented in Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal  
Federalism (Chicago: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972) and Albert Breton and Anthony 
Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States  (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1978). 
25 Robin W. Boadway, Intergovernmental Transfers in Canada 
 (Toronto: Canadian 
Tax Foundation, 1980), p.53. 
26 E.M. Gramlich, "Federalism and Federal Deficit Reduction," National Tax 
Journal, Vol.XL, No. 3 (1987), p.305. 
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horizontal equity, citizens in the same circumstances should be subject to the same tax 
rate and enjoy the same quality of public services regardless of where they live in the 
country. This is not always easy to determine, however, because citizens in different 
parts of the country may have different preferences for public services. Consequently, 
the best way to promote fiscal equity is probably through unconditional grants rather 
than shared-cost programs. 
A fifth argument is that shared-cost programs may enable the federal 
government to coordinate or standardise a program and thus minimize duplication and 
inefficiency. 
A sixth argument is that shared-cost programs will provide both governments 
with an incentive to ensure that the programs are operated as efficiently and 
effectively as possible so as to achieve their objective at the lowest cost. 27 
A final argument is that shared-cost programs may be more cost efficient in that 
they allow the federal government to take advantage of provincial government expertise 
and resources. 
There have also been several criticisms of shared-cost programs. First, some 
concern has been voiced that shared-cost programs undermine the autonomy of 
provincial governments and force changes in their legitimate priorities. Second, many 
believe that accountability of governments is best maintained if the government 
spending the money is responsible for raising it. Third, shared-cost programs are 
sometimes announced after provincial budgets are set, thus disrupting provincial 
budgetary planning. Fourth, there is a worry that some provinces might be induced by 
shared-cost programs to spend more than they can afford and contribute to an increase 
in deficits and debt. Fifth, shared-cost programs can lead to inadequate attention to 
controls over spending since the full cost of the spending is not borne by those making 
the spending decisions. Sixth, provinces that choose not to participate are subjected to 
taxation without benefit. Seventh, shared-cost programs can lead to federal-provincial 
conflict and delays. While the concerns expressed in these criticisms should be borne in 
mind, they do not constitute a definitive case against shared-cost programs. 
3.2.3 Shared-Cost Programs in Agriculture 
The Federal government has made conditional grants to the provinces in the area 
of agriculture since 1913 when it offered grants for agricultural instruction for a ten-
year period. To qualify for these grants provinces had to meet certain standards. 
27 This argument was made by the Federal-Provincial Safety Net Committee, 
Report, p.7. 
40 
The Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA) of 1961 was a 
shared-cost program that provided matching closed-end grant to increase income and 
employment opportunities in rural areas. The grants were for rural land use, water 
conservation, soil improvement, and the diversification of rural economic activity. In 
1966 another conditional grant program the Fund for Rural Economic Development 
(FRED) was established. Unlike ARDA under this program the Federal Government paid 
the full costs of certain projects. In 1969 these programs were consolidated with other 
programs for regional development and social adjustment under the new Department of 
Regional Economic Expansion. 
The most important current agricultural shared-cost program is the Special 
Federal-Provincial Assistance Program. This program, which can be viewed as a 
successor to the Special Canadian Grains Program and is budgeted at $500 million, is 
designed to provide income support to farmers in 1990. Ninety per cent of the 
contribution will go to grain and oilseed producers. The payout of funds will be 
administered by the provincial governments. The Federal Government hoped that with 
the participation of provincial governments this special program would provide $1 billion 
to Canadian farmers. But provincial contributions were disappointing, falling far short 
of the matching target. In many cases the provincial contribution was merely a 
repackaging of existing provincial programs. 
The most important ongoing shared-cost program is Crop Insurance, which was 
introduced in 1959. Its purpose is "to provide stability to farmers' incomes by 
minimizing the fluctuations resulting from crop production losses due to uncontrollable 
natural hazards." 28 The costs of this program are shared between the federal and 
provincial governments and farmers. Until 1989 the Federal Government and producers 
each paid matching premiums and the provincial government bore the administrative 
costs. Since 1989 both levels of government contribute 25 per cent of the total premium 
and 50 per cent of the administrative costs of the program. Farmers pay no more than 
50 per cent of premiums, but the federal and provincial shares vary depending on 
whether the province pays the whole administrative cost. The 1990-91 budget for crop 
insurance is $233 million. 
The National Tripartite Stabilization Programs covering such commodities as 
hogs, cattle, lambs, beans, sugarbeets, apples and onions are also shared-cost programs. 
The distinctive characteristic of tripartite programs is that insurance programs are 
shared by the farmer, the federal government, and provincial governments. They were 
established under the Agricultural Stabilization Act, following an 1974 amendment to 
the Act that provided for federal-producer and federal-provincial-producer cost sharing. 
28 Federal-Provincial Relations Office, Federal-Provincial Programs and Activities 
A Descriptive Inventory 1989-90, p.1-3. 
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The Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program is a shared-cost program to help 
farmers who suffered crop losses as a result of the 1988 drought. The Prairie provinces, 
Ontario and Quebec that participated in this program contribute 25 to 50 per cent of 
program costs. The Federal Government makes payments to the producers. This 
program, which is not ongoing was budgeted at $788 million in 1989-90. 
There are a number of other shared-cost programs. These include: Capital 
Assistance for Veterinary Colleges; the Rabies Indemnification Program; Research 
Station Buildings; and Federal-Provincial Agricultural Sub-agreements. The latter cover: 
Agri Food Development; Livestock Feed Development; Cooperation Agreements; and 
National Soil and Water Conservation Agreements. The general rule for these programs 
is 50/50 cost sharing, but some specific programs have different cost sharing ratios. 
The Agriculture Canada discussion paper Growing Together put forward the 
principle that "Funding of safety net programs should be cost-shared among producers, 
provincial governments and the federal governments." 29 
3.2.4 Fiscal Consequences of Increasing Shared-Cost Programs in Agriculture 
Table 6 provides a summary of existing expenditures on shared-cost programs as 
set out in the 1990-91 Main Estimates. This does not include the cost of the new safety 
net being developed for the grain and oilseeds sector. The quantum leap in resources 
devoted to shared-cost programs resulting from the temporary Canadian Crop Drought 
Assistance Program and Special Federal/Provincial Assistance Program in 1989-90 and 
1990-91 is evident. 
The Grain and Oilseed Safety Net Committee has prepared estimates of the cost 
of the proposed GRIP/NISA programs. Assuming 70 to 80 per cent coverage in the 
Prairies and 90 per cent elsewhere the average costs over the 15 year period 1981-1995 
are estimated to be in the $1.15 to 1.61 billion under the basket approach and $1.27 to 
$1.72 billion under the commodity specific approach. 3° Federal contributions would be 
in the $400 to $600 million range. The cash flow impacts on the Federal Government's 
fiscal position would be even greater in the short run if grain prices remain depressed. 
The GRIP account(s) could be expected to run a large deficit that would have to be 
financed. 
29 Agriculture Canada, Growing Together, A Vision for Canada's Agri-Food Industry, 
November 1989, p.54. 
30 Grain and Oilseed Safety Net Committee, Report to Ministers of Agriculture, 
August 1990, p.39. 
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TABLE 6 
EXPENDITURES OWSHARED-COST PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE 
(Millions of Dollars) 
1987-88 
Actual 
1988-89 
Actual 
1989-90 
Forecast 
1990-91 
Estimate 
Special Fed./Prov. Assistance 
Program 
- 500 
Crop Insurance 215 194 275 233 
National Tripartite 
Stabilization Program 
223 162 125 56 
Canadian Crop Drought 
Assistance Program 
18 788 
Federal/Provincial Agricultural 
Sub-agreements 
37 37 34 55 
Special Regional Development 
Initiatives 
11 13 15 14 
Source: 	 1990-91 Main Estimates, 	 Parts II 	 and 	 III. 
The GRIP/NISA programs may not be the only new shared-cost programs. Market 
returns are expected to remain weak and the gap between net cash income and the $2.5 
to $3.0 billion target income range in the grains and oilseeds sector is forecast to be in 
the $1 to $1.5 billion range. 31 Even with an extended averaging period for support 
prices, GRIP will not provide an adequate level of income support to fill a gap of this 
magnitude. It may thus be necessary to introduce third line of defence measures and it 
may be desirable that they take the form of shared-cost programs. 
In the light of the new shared-cost programs under development and the 
continuing pressure for more financial support until farm incomes improve, it is likely 
that the resources devoted to shared-cost programs in agriculture will continue to 
increase. This will no doubt pose difficulties for the government because of its 
commitment to expenditure restraint and deficit reduction. The situation would be even 
worse, however, if the Federal Government were to bear the whole burden of supporting 
farm incomes without seeking to share the costs with the provinces. 
31 Farm Finance and Taxation Division, Policy Branch, Agriculture Canada, Farm 
Income Financial Conditions and Government Expenditures, 
 July 1990, p.6. 
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3.2.5 Implications for Cost Sharing of Programs in Agriculture 
While the proposed expansion in agricultural shared cost programs would in part 
replace spending on Crop Insurance and other second line of defence measures, it would 
still significantly raise the $1 billion the Federal Government now spends on specific 
purpose transfer payments to provinces other than the Canada Assistance Plan. This 
would reverse the trend since the mid-1970s away from reliance on shared cost 
programs. 
The forms and structures of the new shared-cost programs in agriculture would 
have to be closely monitored to ensure that they were consistent with those in other 
share-cost programs. 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FISCAL-ARRANGEMENTS AND  
AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS FOR FUTURE COST SHARING RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
THE PROVINCES 
3.3.1 Differences Between Shared-Cost Programs in Agriculture and Other Areas 
There are important differences between the recent and prospective application 
of shared-cost programs to agriculture and their earlier application in other areas. The 
motivation for shared-cost programs in health, education and welfare was for the 
Federal Government to exert leadership in areas of provincial jurisdiction in establishing 
national standards. The Federal Government was clearly responding to popular demands 
for new services. In contrast, the motivation for current round of interest in shared-cost 
programs in agriculture would seem to be more related to fiscal pressures on the 
Federal Government to limit spending on providing income support for a depressed grain 
economy and only to a lesser extent to the desire to establish national standards. 
There is no absolute constitutional requirement for provincial participation in 
Federal agricultural programs because they are within existing federal powers of 
Section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. There are four reasons why the establishment 
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of new shared-cost programs in agriculture might be desirable to the Federal 
Government in the present circumstances: 
1) The Federal Government's own exposure to increased spending on agricultural 
income support could be reduced. 
2) Provinces that are paying part of the bill would be less likely to press for 
higher income support levels. 
3) Cost-sharing is more consistent with the joint jurisdiction that the Federal 
Government and the provinces share over agriculture. 
4) Program administration and delivery would be facilitated by joint federal-
provincial action. For example, the proposed Gross Revenue Insurance Program 
could be more efficiently run using the administrative apparatus established for 
Crop Insurance. 32 
The first two reasons seem to be the most important for trying to establish a 
new grain and oilseeds safety net on a shared-cost basis. If there had not been a U.S.-
E.E.C. grain price war and a drought on the Prairies, it is not likely that the push for a 
new shared-cost safety net would be so strong. On the other hand, the second two 
reasons are probably more important in other areas such as the National Tripartite 
Stabilization Programs. Provincial governments had been introducing their own 
stabilization programs on a piecemeal basis and the Federal Government wanted to 
establish national standards. The best way to establish national standards yet to allow 
for provincial flexibility is through a shared-cost program. 
Another important difference between the proposed use of shared-cost programs 
to fund safety nets in agriculture and the use of shared-cost programs outside of the 
agricultural area is that the agricultural shared-cost programs involve contributions by 
producers as well as the provinces. 
3.3.2 Lessons from the Historical Experience with Other Shared-Cost Programs 
The most important warning from past experience is that there has always been 
much dissatisfaction over shared-cost programs on the part of both the Federal and 
provincial governments. This is why there has been a trend away from shared-cost 
programs in other areas such as health and education where block grants were 
substituted for shared-cost programs. While these programs were already "established" 
32 Grain and Oilseed Safety Net Committee, Report, p.6. 
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and hence did not require the same degree of ongoing involvement from the Federal 
Government, it is also true that there was much dissatisfaction on both the Federal and 
provincial government side with a shared-cost approach. The Federal Government was 
unhappy with the weakness of the incentives for cost controls in shared-cost programs 
(the so called 50 cent dollars) and the openendedness and unpredictability of the 
resulting expenditures. The provincial governments were discontented with what they 
viewed as federal interference in their priority setting process and federal restrictions 
on the way they could deliver their programs and the lack of autonomy that this 
implied. It is important that the broader implications of a move to greater reliance on 
shared-cost programs for federal-provincial fiscal relations be fully understood. The 
traditional dissatisfaction with other shared-cost programs is likely to arise in the 
future with respect to the new proposed agricultural shared-cost programs. 
A common factor behind the move to shared-cost programs in agriculture and the 
cutback in EPF and CAP transfers to provinces is the need to curtail spending and 
reduce the deficit. In the case of agriculture, the need for fiscal restraint is leading to 
an increasing reliance on shared-cost programs; in the case of EPF and CAP, it is 
leading to a decrease in the resources devoted to the programs. The current climate of 
fiscal restraint will probably make it more difficult to secure provincial cooperation in 
establishing agricultural shared-cost programs. Even in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
Federal Government was able induce the provinces to participate in shared-cost 
programs in hospital care, medicare and social welfare by providing substantial 
additional funding, federal-provincial negotiations over shared-cost programs were far 
from harmonious. 
3.3.3 The Fiscal Arrangements and Fiscal Capacity 
This study has provided some information that should be useful in demonstrating 
that the provinces can not claim that their fiscal capacity is so limited that they can 
not afford to participate in the proposed agricultural shared-cost programs now under 
development. 
The Fiscal Arrangements provide for equalization which brings the fiscal 
capacity of low income provinces up to near (approximately 92 per cent of) the national 
average and for stabilization which protect provinces against declines in revenue. This 
has two important implications for agricultural shared-cost programs. First, it makes it 
very difficult for provinces to make a convincing case that they can not afford to 
participate in a shared-cost program. Second, it renders unnecessary an equalization 
component in shared-cost programs such as would occur if lower income provinces were 
expected to bear a lower portion of the cost of the program. 
46 
An examination of the fiscal positions of the Federal Government and the 
provinces shows that the federal deficit is much worse on a per capita base than any of 
the provinces (See Chart 8). The Federal Government also has a debt burden that is 
almost three times as high as that of the provinces on average (See Chart 9). Even 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, the provinces with the highest debt burdens have a much 
lower debt burden than the Federal Government. No province can argue convincingly 
that it is in a worse position than the Federal Government to pay its share of the cost 
of an agricultural shared-cost program. 
Variations in per capita spending is much less across provinces than fiscal 
capacity (See Table 4). The spending effort of no province is so heavy that it can not 
afford to participate in any of the agricultural shared-cost program likely to be 
introduced. 
Also while the amount spent on agriculture varies significantly from province to 
province, even the provinces with the heaviest expenditures spend a relatively small 
fraction of their budgets on agriculture (See Table 5). Thus no province can legitimately 
claim that it spends so much on agricultural programs that it does not have enough left 
to participate in any of the agricultural shared-cost programs currently under 
consideration. 
3.4 GUIDELINES TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE SHARED-COST 
PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE 
Two useful sources of principles to guide the development of future shared-cost 
programs in agriculture are the Breau Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements and Growing Together, the Department of Agriculture discussion paper. 
The Breau Task Force enunciated six principles that fiscal arrangements should 
follow. Fiscal arrangements should: 
1) provide governments with access to sufficient fiscal resources; 
2) be fiscally responsible; 
3) provide for fiscal equalization; 
4) maintain sufficient federal control over the personal and corporate income tax 
for stabilization purposes; 
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5) establish uniformity in fiscal relations between the federal government and the 
provincial governments; and 
6) provide for a harmonization of federal and provincial policies and priorities. 
Principles 2, 5, and 6 are directly relevant for shared-cost programs in 
agriculture. 
The discussion paper Growing Together, A Vision for Canada's Agri-Food Industry 
advanced four fundamental policy pillars for agricultural policy of more market 
responsiveness, greater self reliance in the agri-food sector, a national policy that 
recognizes regional diversity, and increased environmental sustainability. It also 
provided seven principles for action for the examination and design of revised safety net 
programs. The Grain and Oilseeds Safety Net Committee provided a set of twenty 
principles for assessing safety net options. 33 The Federal paper on Federal/Provincial 
Roles and Responsibilities also provides a set of seven principles for determining 
federal and provincial responsibilities in the agricultural sector. 34 These principles are 
all important for agriculture shared-cost programs and need not be repeated here. 
Taking into account all of these principles, I put forward the following fifteen 
principles that I consider to be particularly useful in establishing guidelines for shared-
cost programs in agriculture: 
1) Cooperative Federalism; 
2) National Program Objectives and Criteria 
3) Equality of Access; 
4) Equity of Support across Commodities/Regions; 
5) Visibility; 
6) Accountability; 
7) Fiscal Responsibility; 
8) Cost Effectiveness; 
33 Agriculture Canada, Growing Together, pp.34-36 and 52-54. Grain and Oilseeds 
Safety Net Committee, Report to Ministers of Agriculture, 
 April 30, 1990, pp.14-15. 
34 Agriculture Canada, "Roles and Responsibilities," August 1990. 
48 
9) Resource Neutrality; 
10) Adjustment; 
11 Canadian Common Market 
12) Non-trade Distorting; 
13) Stability; 
14) Consistency; 
15) Equitable Cost Sharing. 
To elaborate on these principles, 
1) Cooperative Federalism: 
 The programs should be entered into in the spirit of 
cooperative federalism. The program design and implementation should involve 
extensive consultation with the provinces. While a federal-provincial consensus 
on all aspects of the program may be impossible to achieve, the main features of 
the program should at least be acceptable to the provinces. The current process 
that delegates responsibility for developing policy proposals to a 
federal/provincial committees with producer representation such as the Grain 
and Oilseeds Safety Net Committee and the Federal/Provincial Safety Net 
Committee reporting to Ministers of Agriculture is a good way to build a 
consensus and is certainly consistent with the spirit of cooperative federalism. 
The National Signatory Committee, which will be comprised of federal, 
provincial and producer representatives and will oversee the proposed GRIP, is a 
good way to ensure continued cooperation as least insofar as the proposed GRIP 
is concerned. On the other hand, the provinces complaint about the lack of prior 
consultation before the announcement of the 1990 Federal-Provincial Assistance 
Program suggests that the process may not always be as cooperative as it should 
be. iJ 
35 Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Agriculture, "Joint Provincial 
Paper on Federal-Provincial Cost Sharing /Offloading," August 21-23, 1990, p.11. 
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2) National Program Objectives and Criteria: The program should have a clear 
and detailed explicit statement of objectives against which program performance 
can be monitored. While there can be some flexibility in program administration 
from one region to another to reflect unique regional needs, it is important that 
the program's objective be national. The main purpose of a shared-cost program 
must be to establish national standards or to deal with interprovincial spillovers. 
Less fundamentally but also importantly, there should be clear program criteria 
for administration and explicit mechanisms for monitoring. If necessary, funds 
can withheld if the program is not being run in accordance with its objectives and 
criteria. 
3) Equality of Access: The Federal Government should treat all provincial 
governments equally. If a program is available to one government, it should be 
available to all provincial governments on the same terms. Program participation 
should also be available to all individuals on the same basis. 
4) Equity of Support Across Commodities/Regions: The programs should provide 
equity of support across commodities and regions. The interpretation of equity in 
this sense is a difficult issue that is being addressed by the Federal-Provincial 
Safety Net Committee. 36 The question is whether market and production risk 
or market receipts should be covered. The Grain and Oilseed Safety Net 
Committee defined equitable treatment to be when government contributions are 
comparable over the long run for different commodities and regions. 37 
5) Visibility: The Federal Government's involvement in the program should be 
highly visible. This is important to ensure that taxpayers know what their tax 
dollars are being used for. A government whose programs are not visible is not 
easily held answerable to the public. It is also important that beneficiaries of the 
shared-cost programs realize that the Federal Government is behind the program. 
This is important in fostering a sense of nationhood and mutual interdependence. 
The Federal Government has had a problem in the past with other shared-cost 
programs where the provinces have done little to acknowledge the important 
federal role. The 1986 evaluation of Crop Insurance revealed that most 
beneficiaries do not recognize the federal contribution to the program. How the 
program is presented and the check delivered are the important factors in 
ensuring federal visibility. Crop Insurance is delivered by the provinces and the 
checks are provincial checks. An effort has been made to raise federal visibility 
for Crop Insurance by titling the program Canada/provincial Crop Insurance 
36 Federal-Provincial Safety Net Committee, Report to Ministers of Agriculture, 
p.10. 
37 Grain and Oilseed Safety Net Committee, Report to Ministers of Agriculture, 
August 1990, p.6. 
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Program and designing special checks. The National Tripartite Stabilization 
programs are delivered as national programs with special checks. Under the 
Special Federal/Provincial Assistance Program most provinces will not have time 
to design program checks. Ensuring that the Federal Government gets full credit 
in program publicity and that special program checks are designed are important 
for federal visibility. 
6) Accountability: The provincial governments must be held accountable for their 
use of federal funds. The provincial governments must be able to demonstrate to 
the Federal Government that they are administering the program in a cost 
efficient and economical manner and that the objectives of the program are 
being faithfully pursued. The Federal Government will have to conduct post 
audits on program spending. These should be carried out by the Office of the 
Auditor General rather than a private accounting firm because of the Auditor 
General has greater public credibility and can carry out a Value for Money audit. 
The Auditor General presently audits Crop Insurance and the National Tripartite 
Stabilization programs. The Auditor General will reportedly be expressing some 
concern in this year's report about split responsibility in some agricultural 
shared-cost programs and the difficulties this creates in determining 
accountability. The Auditor General is currently looking at safety net programs 
and will comment on them in next year's report. His comments should be helpful 
in addressing the accountability issue. The Parliamentary Task Force emphasized 
that the administrative arrangements must provide sufficient information to the 
Federal Government that federal ministers can discharge their obligations to 
answer in the House for the disposition of the transfer. 38 
7) Fiscal Responsibility: The programs should have predictable costs and should 
be financed in a fiscally responsible manner consistent with the current climate 
of fiscal restraint. 
8) Cost Effectiveness: The programs should be cost effective and should be 
designed to accomplish their objectives at the minimum cost. A shared-cost 
program is preferable to separate federal and provincial programs when it is 
more efficient. 
38 Parliamentary Task Force, Ibid., p.196. 
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9) Resource Neutrality: The programs should not cause distortions in production 
decisions that run counter to comparative advantage. This implies neutrality with 
respect to commodity production decisions, asset values, marketing decisions, 
and the environment. 39 
10) Adjustment: The programs should foster adjustment to emerging market 
forces and should not provide subsidies to maintain uneconomic agricultural 
production. The programs should build on the strengths of the agricultural sector 
and should foster its efficiency and competitiveness. 
11) Canadian Common Market: The programs should foster the development of a 
Canadian Common Market in agricultural products. The programs should seek to 
eradicate interprovincial trade barriers; foster interprovincial trade; equalize 
agricultural subsidies across provinces and commodities; and eliminate subsidy 
competition among provinces. The National Tripartite Stabilization program for 
redmeats was important in putting an end to provincial competition to establish 
more favourable subsidies for the industry within provincial boundaries. 
12) Non-Trade Distorting: The programs should be consistent with Canada's 
obligations under GATT and should not be trade distorting. Canada's participation 
in the Cairns group and opposition to grain subsidy war between the U.S. and the 
EEC should be borne in mind. The programs should also not be subject to 
countervail. Currently, whenever subsidies are not generally available and can be 
shown to cause injury to American producers, the U.S. can impose countervailing 
duties under their trade laws. Stabilization payments have attracted increasing 
attention in countervail cases. Stabilization payments to pork producers were 
counted in a recent successful U.S. countervail action. The proposal currently 
being considered in the GATT negotiations calls for the establishment of a 
subsidy ceiling that will be phased down by one third over a ten year period. Any 
subsidy that is under this ceiling would not be countervailable. Because of its 
responsibility for international trade, the Federal Government is more sensitive 
about the implications of agricultural support programs for Canada's 
international trading arrangements. In addition, with so many overlapping and 
competing federal and provincial agriculture programs the full extent of the 
subsidy for any particular commodity in a specific region is a difficult issue that 
requires complex calculations. The overall net benefit calculation developed by 
Agriculture Canada is a useful concept with important implications for 
international trading relationships. These are important reasons why the Federal 
Government needs to take the lead in establishing agricultural safety-net 
programs. 
39 This is a criteria advanced by the Federal-Provincial Safety Net Committee, 
Report, p.10. 
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13) Stability: The programs should provide a stable planning horizon for the 
provincial governments and should not be subject to cancellation or modification 
without adequate notice. The final decision in the CAP reference might put 
restrictions on the ability of Federal Government to alter unilaterally the terms 
of shared-cost programs. 
14) Consistency: The programs should be consistent with other shared-cost 
programs in other areas. Otherwise they can be used as precedents by the 
provinces in arguing for changes in other shared-cost programs. It would be 
useful for the Department of Finance to review these programs and to prepare 
some guidelines for consideration. 
15) Equitable Cost-Sharing:  The degree of cost sharing should reflect the degree 
of interest of each level of government in the particular program to be cost 
shared. Perhaps it would be appropriate for the federal government to pay a 
larger share of the costs in areas where it has had the primary role such as 
Prairie grains and research and a lower share in areas such as extension where 
the provinces have had the primary role. The extent of any interprovincial 
spillovers in benefits should also be taken into consideration. The degree of cost 
sharing would have to be negotiated with the provinces as a group since it should 
be the same for all provinces for a particular program. 
Another principle, which could be considered, is that of opting out. Since the 
1965 Established Programs (Interim Arrangements) Act, the Federal Government has 
given the provinces the opportunity to opt out of certain shared-cost programs. The 
opting-out principle had gained such widespread acceptance that it would have been 
enshrined in the constitution if the Meech Lake Accord had been accepted. In my view, 
however, opting out is not a principle that should be generally applied to shared-cost 
programs in agriculture. The main difference between shared-cost programs in 
agriculture and shared-cost programs in other areas is that agriculture is a concurrent 
responsibility under the constitution whereas other shared-cost programs in such areas 
as health, welfare and education were introduced in areas of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction. In agriculture the Federal government does not have to resort to its 
spending powers to justify its involvement. Consequently, restrictions on its spending 
powers such as those advocated by proponents of the provinces right to opt out need not 
apply. 
The principle of equalization, such as occurs when lower income provinces are 
expected to bear a smaller portion of costs, should also as a rule not be applicable to 
shared-cost programs in agriculture. The fiscal capacity of provinces is equalized 
through the Equalization Program and thus including an equalization component in an 
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agricultural shared-cost program would be providing double equalization. 40 It is 
interesting to note that the Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministers of 
Agriculture also concluded that "Ability to pay should be dealt with through a broader 
fiscal framework, such as equalization payments, rather than on a program by program 
basis."41 The application of the principle of equalization to agricultural shared-cost 
programs would also constitute a bad precedent for other shared-cost programs where 
provinces bear the same proportion of program costs. On the other hand, in recognition 
of the unusually difficult situation currently facing grain farmers, it may be appropriate 
to phase in the move to equal treatment of all provinces by according temporarily lower 
cost shares to those provinces such as Saskatchewan and Manitoba that are hardest hit 
by the depression in the grain economy and are recipients of equalization. 
The traditional justification of shared-cost programs in terms of spillovers also 
need not apply to agricultural shared-cost programs because of the Federal 
Government's shared jurisdiction over agriculture. 
The desirability of a major shift towards reliance on shared-cost programs in 
agriculture can not be considered in isolation from the larger issue of the future of 
Confederation. Under Meech Lake the Canadian Confederation would have been more 
decentralized and a move to shared-cost programs in agriculture would have been 
consistent with the spirit of the times. In the post-Meech Lake era with Quebec 
reassessing its place in Confederation and the other provinces being forced to 
reexamine their own positions, the role of shared-cost programs is a more open and in 
many ways more difficult question. 
40 George Carter argues that further equalization through conditional grants is 
inappropriate (Conditional Grants, p.67). Robin Boadway writes that the unconditional 
grant is the appropriate tool for equalizing relative differences among provinces 
(Intergovernmental Transfers in Canada, p.81). These are common views among 
Canadian specialists in public finance. 
41 Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Agriculture, "Joint Provincial 
Paper on Federal -Provincial Cost Sharing /Offloading," August 21 -23, 1990, p.18. 
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3.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
This paper provides all of the general information on the Fiscal Arrangements 
that should be necessary as background for the development of shared cost programs in 
agriculture. Further work on the Fiscal Arrangements should be in response to the 
specific information requirements of the ongoing policy development work. There are 
several areas in which more work might be helpful: 
- A paper providing guidelines for shared-cost programs could be requested from 
the Department of Finance. This would be helpful in ensuring that the new 
shared-cost programs in agriculture are consistent in approach to other shared-
cost programs. 
- Fully articulated multi-year models of program expenditures under the new 
proposed shared-cost programs could be developed. Year-by-year projections of 
financial flows into and out of funds could be prepared under alterative 
assumptions about coverage, crop price and yields by province for each of the 
three participants - federal government, provincial governments, and producers. 
Since this would be an extension of work already underway, it could be best done 
by the appropriate Agriculture Canada Task Forces. 
- A thorough analysis of the agricultural spending needs of provincial 
governments could be done. Agricultural spending could be related to its principal 
determinants. Spending on different types of programs could be looked at on a 
per farmer basis or as a share of the value of production of particular 
agricultural commodities and could be compared across provinces. This would 
provide a better understanding of existing provincial programs and how they 
might be related to new proposed shared-cost programs. 
- Further work could be done to examine the argument put forward by the 
Saskatchewan government that it can not afford to contribute as much to shared 
cost programs in agriculture because of its greater dependence on agriculture and 
because it has to make the same expenditures on health, education and social 
assistance as the other provinces. This issue could be addressed through a 
detailed examination of flexibility of provincial government expenditures using 
data from Statistics Canada's Financial Management System. 
- Existing agricultural shared cost programs could be examined in more detail 
and their implications for future agricultural shared-cost programs could be 
further explored. The programs of most interest would be Crop Insurance, 
National Tripartite Stabilization Programs, the Special Federal/Provincial 
Assistance Program, and the Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program. This 
exercise would be most valuable if it were done by those Agriculture Canada 
officials most familiar with existing shared cost programs. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
APPENDIX TABLE lA 
EQUALIZATION ENTITLEMENTS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1957-58 12 3 17 9 46 0 14 20 12 6 139 
1958-59 20 6 26 23 63 0 14 20 13 7 192 
1959-60 22 6 28 25 78 0 15 24 16 6 219 
1960-61 20 6 26 24 70 0 13 22 15 6 202 
1961-62 21 5 26 24 73 0 13 23 14 6 206 
1962-63 24 7 29 26 69 0 14 23 12 0 203 
1963-64 24 7 31 27 65 0 13 22 7 0 197 
1964-65 27 8 38 33 96 0 19 22 1 0 244 
1965-66 35 10 44 40 133 0 27 29 0 0 318 
1966-67 39 11 48 44 151 0 31 31 0 0 355 
1967-68 66 14 75 64 269 0 40 25 0 0 552 
1968-69 73 16 84 72 387 0 49 26 0 0 708 
1969-70 96 20 97 88 431 0 53 66 0 0 849 
1970-71 97 20 100 93 420 0 55 99 0 0 884 
1971-72 105 20 108 93 453 0 72 89 0 0 940 
1972-73 114 25 124 103 534 0 68 102 0 0 1070 
1973-74 156 33 186 146 737 0 113 116 0 0 1487 
1974-75 175 43 232 169 918 0 125 51 0 0 1711 
1975-76 189 48 252 187 1049 0 151 0 0 0 1877 
1976-77 229 54 298 232 1063 0 153 10 0 0 2041 
1977-78 278 63 342 273 1322 0 237 58 0 0 2573 
1978-79 321 72 375 331 1483 0 292 33 0 0 2097 
1979-80 344 81 428 310 1766 0 344 74 0 0 3346 
1980-81 364 92 469 370 2035 0 368 30 0 0 3727 
1981-82 427 107 528 445 2490 0 399 0 0 0 4395 
1982-83 464 118 574 488 2782 0 439 0 0 0 4865 
1983-84 540 125 605 517 2977 0 466 0 0 0 5229 
1984-85 578 129 620 541 3074 0 480 0 0 0 5422 
1985-86 653 134 596 604 2728 0 427 0 0 0 5143 
1986-87 678 138 620 643 2942 0 471 285 0 0 5775 
1987-88 805 163 732 722 3144 0 726 298 0 0 6589 
1988-89 843 178 824 786 3370 0 800 448 0 0 7250 
1989-90 896 193 865 852 3618 0 832 504 0 0 7761 
1990-91 941 203 918 903 3866 0 884 494 0 0 8209 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1B 
EQUALIZATION ENTITLEMENTS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
(Dollars Per Capita) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 	 N.S. 	 N.B. 	 Que. 	 Ont. 	 Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1957-58 28 31 25 15 10 0 16 23 10 4 
1958-59 47 56 37 40 13 0 15 23 11 4 
1959-60 50 59 39 42 16 0 17 26 13 4 
1960-61 45 54 36 41 14 0 15 24 12 4 
1961-62 46 51 36 40 14 0 15 25 11 3 
1962-63 51 65 39 42 13 0 15 25 9 0 
1963-64 50 67 42 44 12 0 14 23 5 0 
1964-65 56 74 50 54 17 0 19 23 1 0 
1965-66 72 87 58 65 23 0 28 31 0 0 
1966-67 79 96 63 72 26 0 32 33 0 0 
1967-68 132 130 99 103 46 0 41 26 0 0 
1968-69 145 148 110 115 65 0 51 28 0 0 
1969-70 186 176 125 140 72 0 54 69 0 0 
1970-71 188 181 127 148 70 0 56 105 0 0 
1971-72 202 179 136 147 75 0 73 96 0 0 
1972-73 215 223 156 161 88 0 69 112 0 0 
1973-74 290 292 231 226 121 0 113 128 0 0 
1974-75 323 369 286 258 150 0 124 56 0 0 
1975-76 344 407 308 282 170 0 149 0 0 0 
1976-77 411 460 360 343 170 0 150 11 0 0 
1977-78 493 524 410 398 211 0 230 62 0 0 
1978-79 565 587 446 477 236 0 282 35 0 0 
1979-80 600 657 504 443 281 0 333 77 0 0 
1980-81 643 747 555 533 319 0 359 31 0 0 155 
1981-82 751 870 623 640 387 0 388 0 0 0 181 
1982-83 820 967 675 700 431 0 425 0 0 0 198 
1983-84 945 1010 706 735 460 0 446 0 0 0 211 
1984-85 1011 1032 718 763 474 0 455 0 0 0 217 
1985-86 1142 1063 685 850 419 0 402 0 0 0 204 
1986-87 1193 1086 710 905 450 0 440 282 0 0 228 
1987-88 1417 1283 833 1014 477 0 673 293 0 0 257 
1988-89 1482 1378 934 1101 507 0 738 442 0 0 280 
1989-90 1569 1483 977 1185 541 0 767 500 0 0 296 
1990-91 1642 1560 1030 1248 572 0 811 494 0 0 309 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1C 
EQUALIZATION ENTITLEMENTS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
(Per Cent Change) 
Nfld. P.E.I. 	 N.S. 	 N.B. 	 Que. 	 Ont. Man. 
	 Sask. Alta. 
	 B.C. Canada 
1958-59 70.3 80.6 52.9 162.8 36.7 -4.9 0.5 11.7 21.8 38.0 
1959-60 10.0 7.1 6.1 8.8 23.4 9.6 15.2 22.4 -11.9 14.3 
1960-61 -8.1 -6.7 -7.2 -2.4 -10.5 -10.1 -6.8 -6.1 3.4 
-7.8 
1961-62 3.4 -3.6 1.5 0.4 4.0 0.8 6.4 -7.1 -8.2 1.9 
1962-63 14.3 27.8 10.6 5.8 -5.4 2.2 -1.7 -14.0 -100.0 
-1.3 
1963-64 -0.8 4.3 7.6 5.9 -5.1 -5.8 -4.4 -42.3 
-3.3 
1964-65 13.9 12.5 20.4 22.2 47.2 45.0 0.5 -83.1 24.1 
1965-66 28.8 17.3 16.2 20.9 38.5 45.5 32.7 -100.0 30.2 
1966-67 12.3 10.5 9.4 10.8 13.7 12.1 7.5 11.8 
1967-68 67.6 35.2 56.8 43.9 77.6 30.8 -20.1 55.6 
1968-69 11.4 14.1 11.9 12.9 43.9 23.6 5.2 28.1 
1969-70 30.7 20.4 15.2 22.6 11.4 6.7 150.4 20.0 
1970-71 1.7 2.1 2.8 5.8 -2.5 4.0 49.8 4.0 
1971-72 8.1 0.5 8.1 -0.1 7.9 31.6 -10.3 6.4 
1972-73 8.1 22.5 15.1 11.0 17.9 
-5.4 14.9 13.9 
1973-74 37.2 32.7 50.1 41.8 38.0 65.3 13.9 39.0 
1974-75 12.0 27.6 24.7 15.2 24.6 10.6 -56.5 15.1 
1975-76 8.2 12.2 8.6 11.2 14.3 21.1 -100.0 9.7 
1976-77 21.2 14.0 18.3 24.0 1.3 1.7 NA 
1977-78 21.3 15.6 14.8 17.6 24.4 54.3 459.6 26.1 
1978-79 15.5 13.8 9.7 21.2 12.2 23.3 -43.8 13.0 
1979-80 7.2 12.8 13.9 -6.3 19.1 17.8 124.8 15.1 
1980-81 5.7 13.7 9.6 19.4 15.2 7.2 -59.7 11.4 
1981-82 17.3 16.4 12.6 20.2 22.4 8.3 -100.0 17.9 
1982-83 8.7 10.3 8.8 9.7 11.7 10.2 10.7 
1983-84 16.3 6.2 5.4 5.9 7.0 6.1 7.5 
1984-85 7.2 3.0 2.5 4.6 3.3 2.9 3.7 
1985-86 12.9 3.9 -3.9 11.7 -11.3 -10.9 
-5.2 
1986-87 3.8 2.9 3.9 6.4 7.8 10.3 NA 12.3 
1987-88 18.8 18.1 18.1 12.3 6.9 54.1 4.7 14.1 
1988-89 4.8 9.1 12.6 8.9 7.2 10.2 50.3 10.0 
1989-90 6.2 8.5 5.0 8.4 7.4 4.0 12.6 7.0 
1990-91 5.0 5.5 6.1 6.0 6.8 6.2 -1.9 5.8 
Average 
Change 
1980-81 
to 
1990-91 10.0 8.3 7.0 9.3 6.6 9.2 32.5 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2A 
EPF ENTITLEMENTS BY PROVINCE, 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 	 N.S. 
1980-81 
N.B. 
TO 1989-90 
Que. 	 Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1980-81 228 50 341 281 2579 3460 414 387 944 1091 9803 
1981-82 255 55 380 312 2888 3868 460 434 1117 1235 11036 
1982-83 286 62 429 352 3262 4387 521 493 1167 1405 12398 
1983-84 314 68 470 386 3550 4813 572 542 1280 1538 13570 
1984-85 334 73 504 413 3786 5192 615 584 1364 1661 14568 
1985-86 356 79 543 442 4059 5612 663 628 1463 1788 15680 
1986-87 375 84 576 468 4311 6006 706 666 1566 1904 16710 
1987-88 392 88 605 491 4544 6386 744 700 1639 2016 17657 
1988-89 409 93 636 514 4780 6788 781 729 1725 2149 18659 
1989-90 431 98 670 543 5052 7228 819 761 1835 2308 19803 
1990-91 431 99 673 545 5080 7330 823 763 1864 2349 20016 
APPENDIX TABLE 2B 
EPF ENTITLEMENTS BY PROVINCE, 
(Dollars Per Capita) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 	 N.S. 
1980-81 
N.B. 
TO 1989-90 
Que. 	 Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1980-81 404 403 404 404 404 404 404 404 441 409 408 
1981-82 448 446 449 449 449 448 449 449 499 450 453 
1982-83 506 507 504 505 505 504 504 504 504 504 504 
1983-84 550 547 548 549 548 547 546 548 547 547 547 
1984-85 584 584 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 
1985-86 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 
1986-87 660 657 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 
1987-88 689 691 689 690 689 689 689 689 689 689 689 
1988-89 719 719 721 720 720 720 720 719 722 721 720 
1989-90 754 756 756 755 755 755 755 755 757 756 755 
1990-91 751 755 755 753 751 753 755 763 755 750 753 
APPENDIX TABLE 2C 
EPF ENTITLEMENTS BY PROVINCE, 
(Per Cent Change) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 	 N.S. 
1980-81 
N.B. 
TO 1989-90 
Que. 	 Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1981-82 11.5 10.7 11.4 11.2 12.0 11.8 11.2 12.1 18.3 13.2 12.6 
1982-83 12.4 12.6 12.8 12.6 13.0 13.4 13.1 13.5 4.5 13.8 12.3 
1983-84 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.7 8.8 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.6 9.5 9.4 
1984-85 6.3 7.7 7.3 7.0 6.7 7.9 7.7 7.7 6.6 8.0 7.4 
1985-86 6.7 7.5 7.7 7.1 7.2 8.1 7.7 7.7 7.3 7.7 7.6 
1986-87 5.2 6.4 6.0 5.9 6.2 7.0 6.5 6.0 7.0 6.5 6.6 
1987-88 4.5 5.0 5.2 4.9 5.4 6.3 5.3 5.2 4.7 5.9 5.7 
1988-89 4.4 5.7 5.0 4.8 5.2 6.3 5.0 4.2 5.2 6.6 5.7 
1989-90 5.3 6.0 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.5 4.9 4.3 6.4 7.4 6.1 
1990-91 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.3 1.6 1.8 1.1 
Average 
Change 6.5 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.8 7.1 7.0 7.0 8.0 7.4 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3A 
CANADA ASSISTANCE PLAN PAYMENTS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
(Millions of Dollar) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1980-81 53 13 61 79 851 534 69 72 155 314 2206 
1981-82 60 16 71 90 993 619 85 87 240 341 2612 
1982-83 66 18 87 108 1165 742 92 120 306 474 3190 
1983-84 71 17 93 112 1399 831 109 143 326 531 3643 
1984-85 74 18 105 126 1513 944 132 144 334 599 4001 
1985-86 76 21 105 137 1606 1052 141 149 390 594 4284 
1986-87 86 20 124 145 1546 1132 155 161 427 632 4439 
1987-88 88 22 128 152 1581 1320 164 157 443 653 4726 
1988-89 91 23 154 150 1654 1511 198 155 488 663 5109 
1989-90 100 24 157 159 1716 1789 189 152 525 684 5515 
1990-91 103 24 173 170 1752 1946 210 172 534 737 5841 
APPENDIX TABLE 38 
CANADA ASSISTANCE PLAN PAYMENTS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
(Dollars Per Capita) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1980-81 93 102 72 113 133 62 68 75 72 118 92 
1981-82 105 132 83 129 154 72 83 90 107 124 107 
1982-83 117 150 102 155 180 85 89 123 132 170 130 
1983-84 125 134 109 159 216 94 104 144 139 189 147 
1984-85 130 141 121 178 233 106 125 143 143 210 160 
1985-86 132 164 120 193 247 117 133 147 166 207 170 
1986-87 151 156 142 204 236 124 144 159 180 219 175 
1987-88 156 171 146 214 240 142 152 155 186 223 184 
1988-89 160 175 174 210 249 160 182 153 204 223 197 
1989-90 176 185 178 221 256 187 174 150 217 224 210 
1990-91 180 185 194 235 259 200 192 172 216 235 220 
APPENDIX TABLE 3C 
CANADA ASSISTANCE PLAN PAYMENTS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
(Per Cent Change) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. Canada 
1981-82 13.3 29.6 16.9 14.6 16.6 16.0 22.2 20.5 54.6 8.9 18.4 
1982-83 10.9 13.0 22.3 19.7 17.4 20.0 8.4 37.8 27.5 38.8 22.1 
1983-84 8.0 -9.3 7.6 3.7 20.1 11.9 18.6 18.8 6.6 12.1 14.2 
1984-85 3.9 6.0 12.5 13.0 8.1 13.6 21.4 0.7 2.5 12.7 9.8 
1985-86 2.2 17.6 -0.2 8.5 6.1 11.5 6.9 3.6 16.6 -0.9 7.1 
1986-87 12.9 -4.3 19.0 6.0 -3.7 7.6 9.4 8.1 9.6 6.5 3.6 
1987-88 3.4 9.6 3.1 5.0 2.3 16.6 6.2 -2.2 3.7 3.3 6.4 
1988-89 3.3 4.1 20.0 -1.7 4.6 14.5 20.5 -1.2 10.2 1.6 8.1 
1989-90 10.0 6.2 2.2 6.0 3.8 18.4 -4.3 -2.4 7.6 3.2 7.9 
1990-91 2.5 0.4 9.9 7.1 2.1 8.8 10.7 13.4 1.7 7.7 5.9 
Average 
Change 7,0 6.8 11.1 8.0 7.5 13.8 11.7 9.1 13.2 8.9 10.2 
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APPENDIX TABLE 4A 
TOTAL OF EQUALIZATION, 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 
EPF AND CAP TRANSFERS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
N.S. 	 N.B. 	 Que. 	 Ont. 	 Man.,, 	 Sask. 	 Alta. 	 B.C. Canada 
1980-81 603 144 825 686 5328 3994 815 470 1099 1404 15403 
1981-82 694 167 928 798 6192 4487 907 521 1357 1576 17669 
1982-83 765 187 1038 896 6997 5130 1015 613 1473 1879 20040 
1983-84 870 199 1119 963 7712 5643 1.105 684 1606 2069 22020 
1984-85 926 207 1177 1022 8153 6135 1177 727 1698 2260 23536 
1985-86 1018 220 1186 1118 8138 6664 1177 777 1853 2382 24595 
1986-87 1065 227 1257 1186 8511 7139 1269 1037 1993 2536 26281 
1987-88 1202 256 1393 1287 8939 7706 1547 1057 2082 2669 28207 
1988-89 1255 276 1532 1366 9403 8299 1680 1218 2213 2812 30132 
1989-90 1333 297 1609 1465 9977 9017 1742 1302 2360 2992 32172 
1990-91 1376 307 1675 1523 10257 9276 1810 1306 2397 3086 33095 
APPENDIX TABLE 4B 
TOTAL OF EQUALIZATION, 
(Dollars Per Capita) 
Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 
EPF AND CAP TRANSFERS, BY PROVINCE, 
N.S. 	 N.B. 	 Que. 	 Ont. 	 Man. 
1980 -81 TO 1989 - 90 
Sask. 	 Alta. 	 B.C. Canada 
1980-81 1065 1171 976 987 834 466 796 490 513 527 641 
1981-82 1221 1359 1095 1147 962 520 '884 539 606 574 726 
1982-83 1351 1533 1221 1286 1083 589 983 627 636 -674 815 
1983-84 1524 1601 1305 1369 1191 641 1057 692 686 735 888 
1984-85 1619 1657 1362 1443 1256 689 1115 726 726 .793 942 
1985-86 1780 1744 1362 1575 1249 740 1107 771 789 830 977 
1986-87 1875 1787 1440 1671 1301 783 1185 1026 839 878 1037 
1987-88 2116 2018 1586 1807 1356 832 1434 1040 875 912 1101 
1988-89 2206 2139 1737 1913 1416 880 1550 1201 926 944 1163 
1989-90 2335 2283 1816 2038 1491 941 1605 1293 974 980 1227 
1990-91 2401 2351 1879 2104 1517 953 1661 1306 971 986 1245 
APPENDIX TABLE 4C 
TOTAL OF EQUALIZATION, 
(Per Cent Change) 
. 	 Nfld. 	 P.E.I. 
EPF AND CAP TRANSFERS BY PROVINCE, 1980-81 TO 1989-90 
N.S, 	 N.B. 	 Que. 	 Ont. 	 Man. 
	 Sask. 	 Alta. 	 B.C. Canada 
1981-82 15.1 16.1 12.5 16.4 16.2 12.3 11.2 11.0 23.4 12.2 14.7 
1982-83 10.2, 11.8 11.9 12.3 13.0 14.3 12..0 17.5 8.6 19.2 13.4 
1983-84 13.8 6.1 7.8 7.4 10.2 10.0 8.9 11.7 9.0 10.2 9.9 
1984-85 6.4 4.3 5.2 6.2 5.7 8.7 6.5 6.2 5.8 9.2 6.9 
1985-86 10.0 6.1 0.8 9.4 -0.2 8.6 0.1 6.9 9.1 5.4 4.5 
1986-87 4'.6 3.2 6.0 6.1 4.6 7.1 7.8 33.4 7.5 6.5 6.9 
1987-88 12.9 13.0 10.8 8.5 5.0 7.9 21.9 2.0 4.5 5.2 7.3 
1988-89 4.4 7.6 10.0 6.1 5.2 7.7 8.6 15.2 6.3 5.4 6.8 
1989-90 6.2 7.6 5.0 7.3 6.1 8.7 .3,7 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.8 
1990-91 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.0 2.8 2.9 3.9 .0.3 1.6 3.2 2.9 
Average 
Change 8.6 7.9 7.3 8.3 6.8 8.8 8.3 10.8 8.1 8.2 7.9 
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SOURCES: 
The data on fiscal transfers was provided by the Federal Provincial Relations Division 
of the Department of Finance. The following sources and notes were also given: 
Equalization: 
Data for 1957-58 to 1979-80 from The Fiscal Equalization Program, April 1980. 
1990-91 Second Estimate, March 30, 1990 
1989-90 Fourth Estimate, March 30, 1990 
1988-89 Sixth Estimate, March 30, 1990 
1987-88 and earlier years are final calculations 
Established Programs Financing: 
1 .990-91 Advance Calculation, April 10, 1990 
1989-90 Second Adjustment to Advance, December 11, 1989 
1988-89 First Interim Adjustment, March 8, 1990 
1 987-88 Second Interim Adjustment, March 8, 1990 
1986-87 and earlier years are final calculations 
Canada Assistance Plan: 
1990-91 Health and Welfare Update, April 23, 1990 
1989-90 Health and Welfare Update, April 23, 1990 
Earlier years from the Public Accounts 
Notes: 
1. Equalization and EPF are annual entitlements. EPF excludes compensation for 
termination of the Revenue Guarantee (1980-81 and 1981-82). CAP values are 
annual payments. 
2. Equalization includes basic and transitional payments only. 
3. Established Programs Financing entitlements include both cash and tax transfers. 
CAP transfers to Quebec also include a tax abatement. 
4. Equalization associated with the EPF transfer is included with both Fiscal 
Equalization and EPF. The value is subtracted from the total. 
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